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ABSTRACT: Within the context of the broader historical background of the region and 
the theoretical framework on security, socio-cultural diversity and 
political tolerance this particular research deals with the effects of socio-
economic structure on tolerance and combat propensity.  “Socio-
Economic Influences on the Active Combat Participants in Kosovo” 
illustrates how and to what extent socio-economic status has had direct 
or indirect influence on the behavior of the active combatants in the 
highly complex conflict of Kosovo. 
 In terms of research design, the work is grounded in the year-long data 
collection and theoretical research.  The collected data is divided into two 
parts. The first part offers a systematic and quantitative representation of 
the group's demographics relating to their economic and social 
conditions. The second part qualitatively explores the motivations of 
those who participated in political violence in an effort to develop a more 
complete understanding of the conflict’s origins both on the individual 
and group level. 
 The theoretical tools used are the Modernization theory, Cultural 
pluralism, Political instability and tolerance, and Human needs theory. 
The socio-economic analysis of political behavior, suggests possible 
correlation between Socio-Economic rank and tendencies towards 
political intolerance and combat propensity. 
It concludes that, while providing some key factors that help contribute 
to and evaluate the prospects of the much-needed viable peace building 
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and sustainable institutions in divided societies; additional research is 
needed in studying issues of political tolerance in the region.  Moreover, 
this model relies heavily on its socio-demographic and political tolerance 






























Within a broader historical outline of the region and theoretical framework on 
security, socio cultural diversity and political tolerance this particular research deals 
with the effects of socio-economic structure on tolerance and combat propensity.  The 
work “Socio-Economic Influences on the Active Combat Participants in Kosovo” 
illustrates how and to what extent socio-economic status has had direct or indirect 
influence on the behavior of the active combatants in the highly complex conflict of 
Kosovo. 
 In terms of research design, theoretical and historical background, the work is 
grounded in the year-long data collection and theoretical research.  The collected data is 
divided into two parts; the first part offers a systematic and quantitative representation 
of the group’s demographics related to their economic and social conditions, while 
second qualitatively explores the motivations of those who participated in political 
violence and shows an effort in developing a more complete understanding on the 
origins of the conflict on both the personal and group level. 
 At the outset of this study, my goal was to survey and gather a representative 
sample of ex-combatants from the Kosovo civil war that would present information on 
the demographic profile of the combatant population, their motivations and incentives 
for joining and staying actively involved in the conflict.  In an effort to develop a more 
complete understanding of the conflict and its origins, I wanted to explore and show the 
assumed consistency in the demographic profiles of the different warring parties and 
explore the motivations of those who participated in political violence. 
The study presents the findings of the year long research, based on the surveys 
and interviews of ordinary citizens of Kosovo, ex-combatants and professionals, both 
local and international, with deep and widely recognized professional expertise on the 
issues that are the focus of this research and as such highly relevant to the study.  It 
presents information on the socio-economic demographic profile of the population of 
Kosovo, its socio-political opinions, motivations and concerns on the issues relating to 
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political tolerance, violence and combat propensity.  It will provide a qualitative, more 
complete understanding of the motivations of those who participated in the conflict first 
hand and their incentives for doing so.  The research results, in addition to providing an 
(socio-political) understanding of the conflict and its origins, have the potential to show 
and inform the officials on the issues that could prove critical to conflict resolution, such 
as socio-economic based peace negotiations and sustainable peace building. 
Embedding the research question of socio-economic 'influences' on political 
violence and combat propensity within the broader theoretical framework will 
consequently involve interdisciplinary theoretical concepts such as Individual Values and 
Priorities, Political Tolerance and Political Instability, Modernization theory, wide 
ranging theories of (group and individual) Conflicts, Socio-Political theories of 
relationship between Socio-Economic status and analysis of political behavior, and, 
lastly, psychological concepts of Basic Human Needs theories. 
 All of these (and probably some more that I’m unconsciously unaware of) 
theoretical concepts to be presented here have directly or indirectly dealt with the 
research question that has been the focal point of this study, obviously and expectantly 
with different approaches and conclusions on the matter. 
 In this following chapter, I make an effort to systematize and present the above 
mentioned theoretical conceptions in the way they relate to the research question of 
this study.  The focus of this theoretical framework overview will be put on its different 
conceptual but nevertheless tangible connections to the research hypothesis of socio-
economic influences and their bearing on political violence and combat propensity; 
keeping in mind the vast amount of academic literature and high level research 
associated with the above mentioned theoretical concepts, I will present only the ones 
most centrally related to my study. 
By implanting the research into the theoretical framework of Modernization 
theory, Cultural pluralism, Political instability and tolerance, Human needs theory, etc. 
and through socio-economic analysis of political behavior, I suggest to the reader the 
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possible connections between Socio-Economic status and tendencies towards political 
tolerance, behavior and combat propensity. 
It will lead to conclude that, while providing some key sources of information 
that could help contribute to and evaluate the prospects of the much-needed continued 
peace and influence the appropriate policies for peace building and sustainable 
institutions in divided societies; additional research is needed in studying issues of 
political tolerance in the region.  Moreover, this model relies heavily on its socio-
demographic and political tolerance theory predecessors while it is very cautious to take 























2. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Although it is not directly related to the research question proposed in this 
study, I strongly believe that the following historical overview would provide the readers 
with a specific 'prism' if you will, through which the research could be examined and 
analyzed.  It offers a specific chronological viewpoint of the problem and its political 
background which proves essential in ones’ understanding of the history, issues and the 
people associated with the region. 
Kosovo, the province of the present day Republic of Serbia, has definitely shared 
the unfortunate fate with the rest of the region and as such is the focus of my research 
thesis.  In this following chapter I present a 'general' overview of the region's history as I 
believe that understanding the historical background of the region and its geopolitical 
position in throughout history is significant, and to a large extent relates to my thesis 
work. 
Comprehensive history of great nation’s power struggles over their vested 
interests in the region (or elsewhere), nation building, religious upheavals and hence the 
creation of conflicting identities and intractable conflicts would in a nutshell make up for 
the modern history of the Balkan peninsula, which one could regrettably argue, 
perpetually extends its worst self, even to the present day. 
Today, Kosovo is recognized as the name of a complex problem, a problem 
where history meets the present day and where two neighboring peoples, Serbian and 
Albanian, are tied up in the confrontations that have accumulated over the years.  In 
order to better understand the actual political moment of the conflict, in my view it is 








2.1 Historical Overview 
 
The region was first mentioned in 300 B.C. when it was conquered by Alexander 
the Great 300 and later in 4th Century A.D. when it was considered to be the part of the 
Roman province of Dardania.  Greeks and Romans referred to the earliest known 
inhabitants of the region as 'Illyrians'.  Today most of the Albanians scholars argue to be 
direct descendants of the Illyrians.  In contrast, most of the Serbian academic 
community stresses that Albanians are first mentioned in the early middle ages as a 
result of intermixing between nomadic shepherds and bits and pieces of Illyrians and 
'Dardanians' from Thrace.  In all reality tracing such ancestry is definitely extremely 
complicated, but most agree that people living in the region before the appearance of 
the Serbs that migrated from the North are likely to have some genetic relationships to 
Albanians; whatever may prove to be the case, although it could be related to their 
respective narratives, both sides agree that this argument is hardly significant to the 
current conflict.  Today this ethno-genesis of the people is purposely being politically 
mystified, but to base any historical, not to mention territorial, right on the ethnic map 
of Europe to the times dating back before the period of the great migrations would be, 
in a lack of a better scientific term, absurd. 
In the 6th century Slavs crossed-over the river Danube and settled in the Balkan 
Peninsula.  In the area of today’s Albania they settled in plains and river plains as 
agriculture based people, leaving the mountainous regions to the native cattle-herders 
(whose ancestry could probably be traced to today’s Albanians).  Primary meeting 
between these two ethnicities could not be characterized as aggressive in any way, and 
it would not be such until the Islamization of the Albanians in 16th century.  There were 
no fights over lands, forced migrations or destructions; rather, the Serb-Albanian 
relationship in the Middle ages could be termed as symbiotic.  In the medieval Serbian 
state, since the late 12th century, citizens were completely integrated, in both  a 
governmental and social sense, no discrimination or conflict could be traced to  
ethnicity.  The Serbian tsar Stephan Dushan (1331-1355), in line with the medieval 
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notions of the state, which was never termed as national, carried the title of “tsar of 
Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians and Arbanas.” (Batakovic, 1992, p.46) 
The region of Kosovo and Metohija, from the early middle ages, is settled with 
the homogenous Serbian population.  The first Serbian states, in the 10th and 11th 
centuries, are traced to the region of Kosovo, back than an ethnically Serbian region, 
which was under the Byzantine influence until the final incorporation into the Serbian 
state towards the end of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century, ruled by the 
powerful Nemanjic dynasty where it developed into the governmental and cultural 
foundation of the Serbian state.  The dynasty lasted for four centuries and it reached its 
peak during the reigns of King Milutin and later Emperor Stefan Dushan. 
 
2.2 Serbian Heritage 
 
The Serbian Orthodox Church, the national church organization from its 
establishment in 1219, has been instrumental in permanently characterizing the Kosovo 
region as the center of the Serbian state and “guardian” (Noel, 1998, p.67) of Serbian 
lands.  A vast number of dynastic monasteries, as legacies of the Serbian rulers 
(Gracanica, Bogorodica Ljeviska, Banjska, Visoki Decani, Arhandjeli, etc…), with 
iconographic attributes of the state’s sovereignty and continuity of the Serbian rule 
(Nemanjic dynasty) and with relics of the canonized rulers and heads of the church 
represent the foundation on which the national conscience and cultural identity was 
formed and indeed over the years, reinforced.  These historical monuments 
concentrated in one particular area, that have survived the five centuries of Ottoman 
(Islamic) rule are still living national, as well as spiritual, strongholds of the of the 
Serbian people.  Serbian medieval art and architecture in Kosovo are held to be of the 
highest level in than contemporary Europe and its literary creations in these parts 
represent the mainstream of the Serbian written word, which has shaped the 
consciousness of the Serbian population in the middle ages.  The memorandum 
(referred to the ambassadors of the great power nations in London, 1913), stressed the 
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importance of this “holy land” for the Serbian people, where they have “during the 
medieval times reached high levels of civilizations on which lies its European identity.” 
(Batakovic, 1992, p.93) 
Ethnic relations in the region of today’s Kosovo remained unchanged even 
during the Ottoman invasion during the 80’s and 90’s of the 14th century, the region's 
ethnical character was not questioned and it remained strictly Serbian under the rule of 
despots Lazrevic and Brankovic  (successors of the Nemanjic dynasty).  In these times, 
the area of the Serb-Albanian symbiosis was located far in the north-west areas of what 
is known as today’s north-Albanian mountainous region. 
The loss of the state’s freedom and sovereignty under the invasion of the 
Ottomans changed the living conditions of the Serbian people at its core.  Somewhere 
between the eras of Serbian freedom and slavery (under the Turkish rule), stands the 
landmark occurrence, which will (has) become the symbol and the motif of the Serbian 
history:  The Battle of Kosovo (15/28th of June 1389).  According to a place and historical 
significance that this battle has for Serbs, as well as for the majority of Christian 
population of Europe, it can be placed alongside the great battles of Europe such as the 
clashes at Kulick (1380), Poitiers (731) or even Thermopiles (480).  The decisive 
resistance the Serbs put up to the Ottoman invasion of Europe was crushed in the 
military and physical sense (although historians disagree on the outcome of the battle), 
it is an undisputed historical fact that after this moment in history military resistance to 
the Ottomans which, by the 1450’s had slowly occupied the majority of the medieval 
Serbian state, was insignificant, but the death of Serbian knez Lazar and his army has 
gained martyrdom proportions in the historical conscience of the people as the ancient 
sacrifice for the Christianity and the “Kingdom of Heaven” (Noel, 1998, p.114), and is 
heralded as a heroic sacrifice and a spiritual triumph for the ideals of the Christian 
civilization.  Serbian people, for these particular reasons, regard to Kosovo as the key 
characteristic of their identity, history and more than anything else their freedom.  They 
see Kosovo as the primary link to their historical perseverance, as the living knowledge 
of the Serbian medieval state and the notion of Kosovo as its integral part, were crucial 
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factors in the struggles for the liberation and unification that was to come centuries 
later.  According to Bjelica, “…inseparable…is that Kosovo is the home of the Serbian 
nation.  For the Serbian people Kosovo put the seal on its identity became the key to its 
history, the banner of national freedom.  However, the Serbs' attitude towards Kosovo is 
not merely based on memories of the past, nor is the "mythical" factor important in that 
attitude.  The same can be said of its historiographic or political reflections on the 
problem.  Kosovo is not some imaginary legend of the past, but a real historical destiny 
that continues today.” (Bjelica, 2006, p.418) 
 
2.3 Ottoman Invasion 
 
The Turkish invasion moved great ethnic masses in the Balkans and it has caused  
disturbances with permanent but mostly tragic consequences.  Nevertheless, when it 
comes to Kosovo, the first migrations of Serbs in the 15th century did not largely 
influence this area, nor did the Albanians herders’ descent form the north mountain 
region of Prokletije.  In the 16th century, according to the official Ottoman census data, 
Christians were still in absolute majority in the region (compared to the Turks and then 
Islamized Albanians); together with Jews and other Christian minorities (Orthodox 
Greeks, Vlachs and Catholic Albanians), the Serb population represented 97 percent of 
the region’s total population.  The region of “Old Serbia” as Kosovo and Metohija and its 
surrounding areas is also known, according to these sources, in 15th and 16th century still 
lives as a Serbian land. 
Historical sources testify that before the end of the 17th century, under the 
influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the activation of old spiritual centers 
along with the renovation of the Patriarchate at Pec (1557), Serbian resistance to the 
ottoman rule rises.  Ottoman (Islamic) rule was grounded on religious discrimination, as 
Bozanic writes: “Serbia including Kosovo was conquered by the Islamic Ottoman Turks in 1459; 
Bosnia and Herzegovina fell in 1465 and 1483 respectively.  During this time Serbian Christians 
and Jews, as "people of the book", became dhimmis subject to the dhimma or protection offered 
to Christian and Jews in newly Islamized lands in exchange for their lives.  Dhimmi status goes 
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back to the 7th century when the Jews at the oasis of Khaybar in Arabia accepted the treaty 
offered to them by Mohammed.  In exchange for their lives the Jews forfeited ownership of their 
lands were forced to defer to Muslims on the street, in business dealings and under the Shari'a 
law, and were forced to pay heavy taxes to their Muslim conquerors.  This treaty of Khaybar 
became the model by which all Christian and Jews in newly conquered lands became subject to a 
condition referred to by the scholar Bat Ye'or as dhimmitude, a contraction of the two word 
dhimmitude and servitude.  Christians and Jews in lands under Islamic rule remained in the 
status of dhimmitude until the emancipation ordered by the Ottoman Sultan in the middle of the 
19th century under pressure from the European powers.  In reality the oppression of the 
Christians and the Jews in the Balkans didn’t end until Serbia achieved independence in 1912 as a 
result of the first Balkan war.” (Bozanic, 2006, p.387) 
Ivo Andric, Nobel Prize winner, writes in his doctoral dissertation that the 
Ottoman influence and the societal Islamization had “absolutely negative” connotations 
on the region.  Ottoman rule, as mentioned before, was grounded on the laws of 
discrimination and the absolute rule of Islam, with legal possibilities in practice to 
conduct the individual or collective violence, until the physical destruction of the 
individual or areas. 
At root, those were the reasons of the constant resistance of the Serbian people 
for the national freedom and return to the European civilization and the roots of the 
deep demographic changes that took place in the 18th and 19th centuries, which 
underline the problem of today’s Kosovo. 
Led by the church, since the end of the 16th century, the freedom movement of 
the Serbs grows from the constant resistance of the people and its refusal to accept the 
ottoman power.  During the great Austro-Turkish wars (1683-1690; 1717-1737), Serbs 
together with Catholic north-Albanian tribes, participated in great numbers on the side 
of the Austro-Hungarian empire.  After the Austrian defeat, subjected to the cruel 
repressions of the Turks, Serbs migrate northwards on the vast territories from middle 
Macedonia to Danube.  Two great migrations of Serbian people to Austria, under the 
patriarchs Arsenije III Charnojevic (1690) and Arsenije IV Charnojevic-Shakabent (1737), 
are undisputable historical facts.  It is not possible to determine the exact number of 
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refugees, but in the first migration of 1690, it is estimated that 185,000 Serbs migrated 
to Austria.  These migrations have definitely played a role in diminishing the Serbian 
ethnic element within the Kosovo; but from the later developments, and uprisings, it 
can be seen that the remainder of the Serbian population on those territories, which 
was constantly renewed by individual or group migrations by the Serbian population 
within the Ottoman empire, was strong enough for the low scale armed resistance.  In 
reality, until the middle of the 19th century, Kosovo is still an ethnically homogeneous 
and densely populated Serbian land, as it was before the Turkish invasion. 
Albanians migrate into South-Slavic lands on the widespread front from Polimlje 
to Ohrid, individually or in large groups, from the beginning of the 18th century. The 
reasons for this migration could be found in the islamization of the Albanians, 
implemented in the 16th century (at least 50% of the total population of Albania), and in 
the forced islamization and denationalization of the Serbian population.  In their 
migrations, by the 18th century Albanians reach as far as Nish and Sofija on the west, 
Skopje and Veles to the south and northwards they reach as far to the region of 
Sandzak.  Economic ill-fortunes and infertile lands of the north and middle mountainous 
regions of Albania were just a starting impulse of these large scale movements, but 
coupled with islamization and the Ottoman religious policies described earlier in the 
text, they have turned into mass colonization of Kosovo and today’s Macedonia and a 
gravely unlawful discrimination of the Christian  population. 
Indeed, these political, and not so much the economical, circumstances have 
brought the (Islamized) Albanians not just to the new territories but to the privileged 
positions with respect to the Christian population known as 'raja'.  Historians mostly 
agree that the migration of Serbs together with the rest of the Christian population from 
their lands, was not a natural process, and instead it resulted form the various forms of 
violence they were subjected to.  The conflicts between Islamized Albanians and the rest 
of the Christian population intensified proportionally with the scale of the Albanian 




2.4 Serbia’s Independence, Uprisings and Wars 
 
During the first Serbian uprising (1804-1813), Kosovo remained the principle 
target of the Serbian revolutionary movement regarding national unity and the 
uncompromised Serbian sovereignty over the region.  In the region of Kosovo, in order 
to repressively counter these revolutionary uprisings by the Serbs, Ottomans used the 
Muslim Albanian settlers as their main force, thus making every liberation effort by the 
Serbs a direct armed clash with the Albanians in the region.  Serbian historians stress the 
terrors endured by the Christian populations during these times.  Another pivotal 
moment in the repression of the Christian population was a late attempt by the Turks to 
reform the diminishing Ottoman Empire and bring it closer to the European influence 
(known as Tanzimat, started in 1839) which as Petrovic states: “…aroused resistance 
among Albanian Muslims who, with the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, turned against the 
reform to protect their old privileges, religious and national discrimination, and, as they said, the 
"true faith". Thus, the Christian masses became the chief victims of an Albanian anti-reformist, 
conservative and financial movement in a series of local rebellions and pogroms.” (Petrovic, 
2006, p.399.) 
The first and second liberation wars (1876-1877; 1877-1878), fought between 
Serbia and Montenegro on one side against Turkey, were the first frontal and serious 
confrontations between Serbs and Albanians.  Muslim Albanians fought the Serbian 
troops defending the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, defending the occupied lands.  
Turkey’s defeat represented the loss of these territories and approximately 30,000 
Albanians left the liberated area.  In the border dispute with Russia in the Berlin 
Congress of 1878, Serbia managed to hold only some parts of the liberated territories.  
The remaining Serbs in Kosovo were then put to 'terrible' and 'bloody' revenge, 
organized by the Prizren League, which was founded the same year. 
The Prizren League marks an important moment in the constituting of the 
Albanian national ideology and additionally strained the relationships between the 
Serbian and Albanian populations.  Diminished ottoman influence and growing struggles 
by the Turks in defending the integrity of the Empire against the newly independent 
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nations of Serbia and Greece, intensified the efforts of the Islamized Albanian 
population in searching new ways of countering the new ethnic changes and conquests 
of the Balkan’s Christians.  League’s statute was directed against not only newly formed 
Balkan states and its allies, but also against Turkey, whose weakness has become a 
danger.  Most of the Serbian historians deem the “league” as “aggressive, revenge-
seeking, conservative and nationalist” (Savich, 2000, p.44) but understate the important 
fact that it has successfully managed to connect Albanians of all three faiths (Muslim, 
Christian Orthodox and Catholic) for the first time.  The three decades after the Berlin 
congress, 1878-1912, could be characterized by prosecutions, destruction and expulsion 
of the Serbs, only in this period the ethnic balance of the region was definitely changed.  
250,000 people left the region for Serbia, these forced migrations especially intensified 
during the short war between Turkey and Greece in 1897.  Here, Albanian historians 
mention the Albanian revolutionary moments against the Turks and especially stress the 
four year period 1908-1912, when even Skopje in today’s Macedonia, fell to the 
Albanian forces. 
During the first Balkan War (1912) Turkey and Albania were attacked by 
Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece.  Petrovic writes: “Serbs joined the army in 
large numbers to avenge the Serbian defeat by the Turks at the Battle of Kosovo Polje.  
At this time Kosovo was mostly Albanian.  Serbs entered Pristina as Albanians retreated 
to the mountains.  The Serbian army destroyed Turkish and Albanian houses and there 
was much plundering and killing.  Serb peasants followed the army into Kosovo re-
occupying the land.  The Albanians fought fiercely but lost the war and Kosovo came 
under Serbian authority.  In 1913, in the second Balkan War, Bulgaria attacked the 
Serbian and Greek armies in Macedonia.  They miscalculated and were quickly and 
decisively defeated.  Among the outcomes Serbia nearly doubled in size obtaining most 
of Slavic Macedonia.” (Petrovic, 2006, p.403)  Political and legal aspects of the nations 
borders and future development between the Albanian and Serbian nations was crated 
at the London Conference of the European powers (1912-1913), Serbia was awarded the 





After the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo 
Princip, in Sarajevo (June, 1914), Austro-Hungary together with Germany declared war 
on Serbia which was backed by Russia, Great Britain and France.  The causes and effects 
of this war are many and widespread but for the sake of this paper I will limit the 
discussion on the Batakovic’s brief review of events only connected to the region of 
Kosovo.  He writes:  
“The declaration of war by Austria-Hungary was greeted with considerable satisfaction 
in Albania for understandable reasons.  Also for understandable reasons Serbia saw Albania and 
Albanians as its enemy.  As a result vicious guerrilla fighting took place between Serbs and 
Albanians in Kosovo with atrocities on both sides and a flow of refugees of Albanians into 
Albania.  In 1915, the Western allies, in the secret Pact of London, agreed to divide Albania 
between Greece and Italy leaving only a small autonomous state in the central region.  Austria-
Hungarian and Bulgarian troops moved into Kosovo.  And after the two initial victories at 
mountains of Cer and Kolubara over their Austro-Hungarian adversaries, Serbian armies were 
forced to what is known as "The Great Serbian Retreat", a disastrous trek across Kosovo and the 
snow- covered mountains of Albania.  The army was accompanied by thousands of Serb civilians 
who were terrified by what they had heard about the fate of Belgium at the hands of the Axis 
powers.  The best estimate is that 100,000 Serbs lost their lives during this grueling retreat.  
Kosovo was occupied by Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Many Kosovar Albanians joined the 
Austria- Hungarian army.  Albanian language schools were opened to undermine the Serbian 
presence.  After the tide of battle turned against Austria-Hungary in 1918 the Serb army took 
revenge massacring women and children and destroying homes.  In retaliation guerilla warfare 
against the Serbs was relentless. The peace treaties of 1919-1920 established a Yugoslav state 
with the name "The Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs".  The name was shortly changed to 
Yugoslavia.  Included in the Kingdom, which was a constitutional monarchy, beside those 
mentioned above were Bosnia- Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia.  Kosovo was again an 
integral part of Serbia. The Kingdom was comprised of 12 million people, of whom 400,000 were 
Albanian.  It was overwhelmingly a Slavic state.  In contrast 64% of the population of Kosovo was 
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Albanian, and of these three-quarters were Muslim.  The Kingdom was governed from Belgrade.” 
(Batakovic, 1989, p.108) 
Attempts of the Serbian (then the Yugoslav/South Slavic) state, focused on using 
the agrarian reforms and colonization, to establish an ethnic and national balance in the 
region failed and eventually managed to create even more 'bad blood'.  During the 20’s 
and 30’s of the 20th century, 60,000 Serbs and Slavs settled in the region, they occupied 
mostly barren and unusable lands and were openly opposed even by the local Serbian 
population.  Initiatives, like the evacuation of Muslims from the Balkans organized by 
Turkey and supported by the local government were not systematically conducted and 




After the April (6th-17th) collapse of the kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941, Croatia, 
including Bosnia-Herzegovina, became a Fascist state allied with Germany and which 
killed and persecuted hundred thousands of Serbs; Slovenia was annexed to Italy and 
Montenegro was occupied by Italian forces; Serbia, Macedonia and Greece were 
occupied by Germany (Kosovo was occupied by Albania except for the important mining 
region which remained under German control).  In Kosovo, under Albanian and German 
rule nearly 100,000 Albanians moved into Kosovo.  Serbs were harassed and attacked by 
the occupying force of Albanians.  The “Second Prizren league” was formed in 1943, and 
it operated under the auspices of first Italian and then German occupation.  It is 
estimated that at least 100,000 Serbs were forcefully expelled from the region during 
the years of war (1941-1944).  Bjelica also adds: 
”…in 1943 the 2nd Prizren League was established, with delegates from all Albanian 
territories including Kosovo, and with similar objectives.  During the war years Serbs and 
Montenegrins in Albanian occupied territory were brutalized by the SS "Skanderbeg" division 
which was comprised of Albanian soldiers under German officers. Albanian village police units 
also were involved in these activities directed against Serbs.  After the war, thousands of Serbs 
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and Montenegrins were prohibited from returning to Kosovo, and thousands of Albanians 
immigrated into Kosovo.” (Bjelica, 2006, p.417) 
 
2.5 Post War Kosovo and Metohija 
 
After the war, which saw the allies turn their support from Monarchist resistance 
to the communists, the region of Kosovo enters the new communist Yugoslavia under 
the Serbian rule (Under the 1946 constitution, the region was defined as an autonomous 
region under Federal, not Serbian jurisdiction).  The next constitution, in 1953, reduced 
the autonomy for Kosovo and by 1956 Albanian nationalism resurfaced which (along 
with disarmament of the nationalists) led to the 1963 constitution and a complete 
reduction of the regions autonomy, placing it under the Serbian rule. 
In 1967, after Tito’s first visit to Kosovo, and the falling-out of the top communist 
leadership of the communist party which resulted in the purging of Serb nationalist 
Aleksandar Rankovic, more concessions were made to Albanian nationalism, dealing 
with languages, education and other cultural issues.  According to Jansen, “flood of 
Albanian nationalism was the predictable result” resulting in an increase in the ethnic 
Albanian population from 67% to 74% (1961-1971) due to the illegal immigration of 
Albanians from Albania into Kosovo and exodus of Serbian population.  As these events 
intensified, the 1974 constitution made Kosovo a completely autonomous province and 
equal to Serbia at the federal level. In 1978 the one hundredth anniversary of the first 
Prizren league was celebrated and the Albanian nationalism reached its peak.  By the 
year 1981, 100,000 Serbs have now left Kosovo and Albanian population rose to 77% of 
the total inhabitants of the region.  Serbian historians rarely fail to note that these 
occurrences were ensued by great number of forced expulsions employing if not the 
same but similar methods as the 19th century murders.  Petrovic and Blagojevic wrote 
that “…rapes, fights, psychological and moral tortures, illegal overtaking of property, 
destruction of crops, cattle and woods, social and legal injustice and discrimination…had all 
been organized into the Albanian terror which have methodically created the psychosis of 
18 
 
insecurities and fears among the Serbs and Montenegrins which consequently lead to their 
expulsion.” (Petrovic and Blagojevic, 1990, p.146) 
One could argue, as Petrovic and Blagojevic do, and most of the historians agree 
upon these facts, that in a certain part of their republic (meaning Kosovo) Serbian ethnic 
populations have been reduced to a minority (without minority rights) while its 
population percentage in the region constantly fell from 28% in 1948, to 15% in 1981 
(most notably between 1961-1981), while Albanian ethnic group in contrast 
proportionally grew, not only because of the high birth rates recorded among the 
population but also by uncontrolled and massed immigration from the neighboring 
Albania. 
 
2.6 Recent History, Last 25 years (1980~present) 
 
The main problem one encounters when trying to historically systematize the 
last quarter of the century with regards to the region of Kosovo and Metohija and its 
ethno-political past is the lack of the historical perspective needed for this type of 
report.  The majority of the sources are contradictory (even more than usual) and I will 
try to limit myself only on those sources that are more or less confirmed by both (or 
more) sides.  Keeping in mind that one should look at these socio-political proceedings 
from the perspective of events unfolding during and in light of the brake-up of Federal 
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (1989-1998). 
In the 1980’s a series of riots hits Kosovo, what started out as a student protest 
over the overcrowding of Pristina’s University in 1981, turned out to a full scale riot 
where Serbian citizens were beaten, their homes burned and their shops looted. This 
consequently led to even more Serbs settling out of Kosovo, under the pressures of 
extremist Albanians.  Also by this time, according to Jansen, strong underground 
movement for the “National Liberation of Kosovo” developed and the remaining Serbs 
felt, and “were indeed threatened”, this encouraged the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
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Sciences to issue a memorandum calling for the revocation of the Kosovo’s autonomy 
and “de-Albanization” of the province. 
All scholars agree that during the period of 1974 until late 1980’s, ethnic-
Albanians in Kosovo undeniably enjoyed the most administrative and cultural autonomy 
in their history whether under Ottoman, Serbian or indeed Albanian rule.  Politicians 
and scholars widely disagree with regards to the goals of the Albanian national politics 
in this region; it ranges from as far as the creation of Greater Albania and unifications 
with Albania and incorporation of some parts of what is today’s Greece, Macedonia, 
Serbia and Montenegro, to independence of the region itself and finally to the status of 
a republic within Yugoslavia. 
I will continue with the chronological presentation of the key events in the 
region and limit the comments as much as possible as the details and the description of 
these events are mostly colored with political or ethnic national agendas.  Beginning in 
November of 1988 with the first miners strike, which again ignited the violent 
demonstrations in which “Serbs in Kosovo were terrorized and thousands of Serbs from 
Belgrade demanded that order be restored in the province” (Jansen, 2002, p.221) and 
the March of 1989 when the  Serbian government stripped the region of its autonomy 
(the process was later completed in September of 1990), the history of Kosovo becomes 
one of political unilateralism (Serbian program of Achieving Peace Freedom and Equality 
and Albanian refusal to accept this program, following the unrecognized declaration of a 
sovereign republic of “Kosova” and its constitution), ethnic skirmishes and violence 
between the ethnic Albanian extremists and Serbian security forces and unfortunately 
as always, civilians. The already strained political differences mounted, escalating with 
the total withdrawal of the ethnic Albanians from the Serbian political life by the 1992 
while Serbs intensified the importance of their cultural heritage in Kosovo. 
During these years of civil strife, apart from some minor interruptions, 
international involvement in the crisis increases only in the early 1998 with the creation 
of Contact Group for Kosovo with representatives of Germany, France, Russia, Great 
Britain and the United States.  After some bitter diplomatic negotiations and threats of 
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NATO military intervention, Serbian government agrees to allow 1,800 UN observers 
into Kosovo and withdraw the bulk of its security forces from the region; during this 
time a guerilla group know as Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) intensified the attacks on 
the Serbian civilian and security targets which brought back the Serbian security forces 
in the region and the agreement fell apart in October the same year.  Final negotiations 
were held at Rambouillet in France under the threat of ensuing NATO air campaign; it 
was given a two-week time frame to negotiate the end of guerilla war.  After the initial 
peace conference failed, it was then moved to Paris and the air-campaign was extended 
for another two weeks.  Jensen summarizes the negotiations: 
”…settlement, dictated by the West required Yugoslavia to withdraw its forces from 
Kosovo, the KLA to lay down their arms, NATO peace-keeping troops on the ground to enforce 
the agreement and a three year period to settle the political future of Kosovo. Yugoslavia 
believed that in three years following the required referendum it would be forced to grant 
Kosovo complete independence which was and is the stated goal of the KLA…required Yugoslavia 
to surrender to NATO many aspects of its national sovereignty.  It is not surprising that 
Yugoslavia was unwilling to sign the Rambouillet document.” (Jansen, 2002, p.212) 
But this time KLA under the pressures (and perspective assurances of the 
bombing campaign) of the United States has signed the agreement and the air-
campaign was initiated by NATO on the 24th of March 1999, it lasted for 73 days. During 
this time Serbian security forces stepped up their military campaign against the Albanian 
rebels and drove the KLA outside the borders of today’s Kosovo, coupled with the NATO 
bombing this campaign caused an exodus of between 100,000 and 700,000 Kosovars 
(majority ethnic Albanian) from the region.  At the beginning NATO miscalculated 
Belgrade’s resolve to fight and the peace deal was not brokered until a wider array of 
both civilian and economic infrastructure was being intensely targeted, un-doubtingly 
setting the country’s economy back for decades.  When a peace deal was finally 
brokered with the intense Russian diplomatic effort, both sides had to compromise; 
Under the UN resolution 1244, Yugoslavia has agreed to "substantial" autonomy for 
Kosovo, withdrawal of all Serb military, police and paramilitary forces, return of all the refugees, 
and an UN led armed security presence in Kosovo with "substantial" NATO participation but 
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under the auspices of the Security Council. The agreement calls for respect of the territorial 
integrity of Yugoslavia, Kosovo remains in Yugoslavia, the agreement is under the authority of 
the Security Council of the United Nations not NATO, and calls for involvement of Russian troops 
in the peacekeeping forces.” 
In the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, the international community was not able 
to prevent the expulsion of almost all (but some) Serbian population from the region by 
the Albanian extremist forces.  In more recent developments, the Security Council of the 
UN, based on the facts gathered by the contact group for Kosovo, some indirect 
negotiations between governments in Belgrade and Pristina, and the UN special envoy, 
ex-Finish president Marti Arthisari, evaluated the standards of the resolution 1244 and 
proposed the new resolution that represents the road map and a future political model 
for mutual co-existence for the province.  Without the inclination and any further 
speculation on the matter, days to come will provide the answer to its legacy.  The 
Government of Kosovo has unilaterally proclaimed region's independence from Serbia 
proper which was recognized by the United States and most of the EU countries and in 
contrast, not by Russia, China, India, Spain, etc.; Serbia's government has challenged the 
legality of such unilateral independence and hence the recognitions, and the legality of 
the case and the court's projected jurisdiction on the matter is currently set to be 
processed in front of the International Tribunal. 
 With all this said, we can only observe that, in the current geo-political moment, 
again today Kosovo is faced with real problems of decreasing international funding and 
increasing international debt, a non-functioning economy and lack of governmental 
infrastructure.  With questions of the future political status of the province looming, 
people are left with highly institutionalized organized crime and corruption that, 










 At the outset of this research, my goal was to survey and gather a quantitative 
representative sample of ex-combatants from the Kosovo civil war that would present 
information on the demographic profile of the combatant population, their motivations 
and incentives for joining and staying actively involved in the conflict.  In an effort to 
develop a more complete understanding of the conflict and its origins, I wanted to show 
the assumed striking consistency in the demographic profiles of the different warring 
parties and explore the motivations of those who participated in political violence.  After 
an approximately four months of uphill battle, of trying to set up promised (and 
sometimes prepaid) interviews and surveys, and the same amount of time of delays and 
broken deals and promises by the responsible administrative officials;  I did the next 
best thing. 
The study presents the findings of the year long research, based on the surveys 
and interviews of the ordinary citizens of Kosovo, ex-combatants and professionals, 
both local and international, with deep and widely recognized professional expertise on 
the issues that are relevant to the study.  It presents information on the socio-economic 
demographic profile of the population of Kosovo, their socio-political opinions, 
motivations and concerns on the issues relating to political tolerance, violence and 
combat propensity.  It will provide a qualitative, more complete understanding of the 
motivations of those who participated in the conflict first hand and their incentives for 
doing so.  The research results, in addition to providing an (socio-political) 
understanding of the conflict and its origins, have the potential to show and inform the 
officials on the issues that could prove critical to conflict resolution such as socio-







 3.1 Research Methodology 
 
 The main method for gathering demographic information was through the 
administration of a close ended questionnaire.  The questionnaire was designed to 
gather information (demographic data) on eight different socio-economic variables; 
Age, marital status, number of children, number of supported persons in the household, 
education, occupation, monthly income and estimated net worth.  It also, at the end, 
asked two open questions, both relating and intended to measure the levels of political 
tolerance and socio-economic influence on combat propensity in civil conflicts.
 Surveys were administered among the thirty (30) randomly selected citizens of 
Kosovo and Metohija, both to the fifteen (15) ethnic Albanians and fifteen (15) ethnic 
Serbs.  The sample selected was in itself random, but cognitive effort was made to keep 
the selection surveyed as diverse as possible (at least age vise).  The surveys were 
administered in the two neighboring municipalities in Kosovo and Metohija, Kosovska 
Mitrovica and Pristina. 
 There were three types of interviews administrated to gather as much 
qualitative data as possible.  First it involved two (2) ex-combatants, one (1) ethnic Serb 
and one (1) ethnic Albanian, that were closely and actively involved in the civil conflict; 
Second, two (2) high ranking NGO officers, one (1) ethnic Serb and one (1) ethnic 
Albanian that were actively involved in the data gathering about the fighting and 
identifying both the civilian and military victims of the conflict; and the Third, two (2) K-
FOR officers, stationed in Kosovo, both with extensive operational experience and 
knowledge of the Balkans which dates back to the beginning of the 1990’s. 
 After establishing the socio-economic demographic of the interviewees (for what 
its worth) by administering the short survey similar to the one described earlier in the 
text administered to the non-combatant population, consequently the interviews 
followed. 
During the interviews, the focus is placed on the following issues; on the 
mechanisms for recruitment, motivation for participation, political preferences before 
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the war, during the peace negotiations and today after the conflict.  I tried to examine 
and take a deeper look into the command structure of the forces, the economic 
resources available (before, during and after the conflict), the length of the combatant 
involvement, the interaction and the treatment of the civilians, the disarmament and 
reintegration into the post-war society.  Also, the same two open ended questions 
intended to measure the levels of political tolerance and socio economic influence on 
combat propensity (in civil conflicts), that were administered in the survey taken by the 
non-combatants, were asked again, this time just in the from of an Semi-structured 
interview. 
 
3.2 Limitations and Potential Sources of Bias 
 
A number of sources of bias must be considered when studying and evaluating 
the findings presented in this report.  First and foremost, while in the study I deal with a 
violent civil conflict between two major ethnic groups (Albanian and Serbian), reading 
this paper one must know that, despite the fact that I honor the academic and ethical 
impartiality while gathering and interpreting the collected data, this study is done by a 
Serb; and if for no other reason, it may be challenged or scrutinized only because of that 
fact. 
The ongoing processing and investigation of war crimes by the  Hague 
International War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia is omnipresent and still under 
way in the region today and has therefore  probably affected or limited some of the 
answers in the interview of the ex-combatants.  The presence of the NGO officers during 
both of the interviews and the guaranteed anonymity of the participants may have 
somewhat helped in minimizing this potential source of bias. 
When in comes to the issues of political tolerance, while as mentioned before, a 
conscious effort is made to keep the representative sample as varied and diverse as 
possible, the sheer fact that in a society not so far removed from the recent civil conflict; 
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the individuals that agreed to participate in the research could prove to exhibit higher 
levels of political tolerance than that of their respective societies. 
On the similar token, people in the region have had vested interests in this 
conflict on a deep and personal level for such a long period of time that, and this 
especially applies to some among the older population in the representative sample, 
that the answers they provided that could have came across as more tolerant in terms 
of levels of their political tolerance could actually be attributed to the psychological 
tiredness or exhaustion in terms of their personal regard to the conflict and not so much 
to the more tolerant political attitudes explained by the variables in this research.  
Therefore, younger populations in the representative sample tend to be less affected by 
this above mentioned issue, accordingly. 
The research model heavily relies on socio-demographic and political sources of 
attitudes and almost totally excludes the psychological factors and antecedents that 
could also prove to be at the foundation of the researched behavior.  This is simply 
caused by the limitations in data gathering, and although during the interviews I try to 
inquire into the matters such as psychological insecurities, fears and perceived threats, 
etc. and some of the psychological factors could be assumed from the socio-
demographic data, the conclusions drawn on that basis alone should be taken with a 
certain dose of academic restraint. 
Data related issues notwithstanding, one can draw some tentative conclusions 
and propositions with regard to political tolerance in the society, and the role of the 











4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 Embedding the research question of socio-economic 'influences' on political 
violence and combat propensity within the broader theoretical framework will 
consequently involve interdisciplinary theoretical concepts such as Individual Values and 
Priorities, Political Tolerance and Political Instability, Modernization theory, vast ranging 
theories of (group and individual) Conflicts, Socio-Political theories of relationship 
between Socio-Economic status and analysis of political behavior, and lastly, 
psychological concepts of Basic Human Needs theories. 
 All of these (and probably some more that I’m unconsciously unaware of) 
theoretical concepts to be presented here have directly or indirectly dealt with the 
research question that has been the focal point of this study, obviously and expectantly 
with different approaches and conclusions on the matter. 
 In this following chapter, I will make an effort to systematize and present the 
above mentioned theoretical conceptions in the way they relate to the research 
question of this study.  The focus of this theoretical framework overview will be put on 
its different conceptual but nevertheless tangible connections to the research 
hypothesis of socio-economic influences and their bearing on political violence and 
combat propensity; keeping in mind the vast amount of academic literature and high 
level research associated with the above mentioned theoretical concepts, I will present 
only the ones most centrally related to my study. 
 
4.1 Political Tolerance 
 
Political Tolerance is thought to mandate specific obligations for individuals and 
communities which, when fulfilled, result in a peaceful, civil and ultimately more 
democratic society. 
The research and literature on political tolerance presents numerous social and 
political sources of attitudes (variables) that affect group’s and individual’s political 
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behavior.  Much of this literature emphasizes the valuable influence of education on 
greater acceptance of political diversity and diversity in general (It is worth mentioning 
that  some of the literature, although confirming the link between education and 
tolerance, questions the strength of the connection, exp. Sullivan 1982, p.784), it 
suggests that one of the reasons why higher education tends to be linked with greater 
political tolerance is the fact that it leads to the creation of individual values and 
priorities that are conducive to and allow greater openness and commitment to political 
diversity. 
One of the reasons for the salutary effects of education on tolerance, according 
to Golebiowska, lies in the fact that it influences the individual value priorities that are 
either conducive to or obstructing greater political and social tolerance.  This is 
attributed to the primary function of education, which is to expand one’s intellectual 
horizons through exposure to greater heterogeneity of people and ideas. 
In advanced industrial societies we are able to observe the shift in the individual 
values and priorities that convey important connotations for political tolerance 
(Flanagan, 1987, p.1303).  For example, Flanagan notices that emergence of the 
unprecedentedly high levels of economic prosperity in advanced industrial (and 
democratic) societies have initiated a gradual shift in individual’s values and priorities 
and demonstrate the imposing influence of education on tolerance due to its stimulus 
and shaping of the individual’s values systems.  Although the majority of the literature 
on political tolerance endorses the view that higher levels of education indeed does lead 
to the higher acceptance of political diversity in general, it does not suggest that 
education solely account for the established increase in political tolerance. 
Inglehart suggests that people brought up under different economic conditions 
are likely to demonstrate different “value priorities” (Inglehart, 1990, p.95).  According 
to Inglehart, economic prosperity creates a sense of personal security that manifests 
itself in a decline of “vulnerability to the external environment” (Inglehart, 1990, p.306).  
This sense of security, when physical survival is assured, generally leads to greater 
tolerance towards diversity than usually exhibited in the cases where the competition 
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for survival is present.  Security and conformity, according Flanagan, then leads to 
openness and “throwing off constraints of traditional customs and religious beliefs, 
opening oneself to new ideas, adopting more accepting attitudes toward new lifestyles 
and a broader range of moral behavior and more tolerance and empathy with people 
and groups that are different from oneself” (Flanagan, 1987, p.1316) 
Political tolerance is more directly or indirectly connected to, and affected by, a 
number of different sources of social or political attitudes; these variables also hold an 
important position in the theoretical discourse of political tolerance and deserve 
mentioning.  They include age, religious affiliation, race, political party affiliation, 
profession, region, levels of religiosity and gender. 
When considering political tolerance, Golebiowska presents the theoretical 
expectations concerning the relationship between education, various of the above 
mentioned value-variables and political tolerance.  She emphasizes the role of high 
education as it promotes greater tolerance directly thorough its impact on tolerance 





4.2 Modernization Theory 
 
Modernization is characterized as a phased and gradual, irreversible progression 
towards relatively homogenous forms of liberal democracies and, as a natural 
consequence of this process, positive changes in cultural values, individual autonomies, 
political tolerance, rationality and legalism, etc.  Modernization and development 
theorists like Samuel Huntington suggest that modernization reinforces an “existing 
nation-state political state in which liberal democracy is held up as an ideal form of 
political organization…” (Shapiro, 1997, p.54) and as such consequently lead to the 
reduction of the potential conflicts on both individual and group level.  Lately we can 
observe a trend where traditional modernization theory goes in line and somewhat 
converges with the new emerging literature on globalization and the new world order.  
According to the concepts put forth by the modernization theorists, “well-designed 
constitution, strong legal and regulatory infrastructure and defined political and 
economic freedoms…” (Shapiro, 1997, p.58) lay a solid foundation for the politically 
peaceful liberal democracies. 
At this point, it is important to bring up the notable fact that in this work we will 
focus on the modernization theory as it relates to the political tolerance with regards to 
conflict and the combat propensity; and although we will not focus on the vast amount 
of academic literature and theory that stresses not so salutary political effects of 
westernized style modernization in the developing societies and the third world where it 
is known to create class dislocations as growing discrepancies between rich and the 
poor, minorities, political and psychological stress on groups and individuals because of 
the economic changes etc. I feel that it is nevertheless worth mentioning, as these 
developments intensify with modernization. 
Modernization theories see industrialization and its increasingly complex division 
of labor, enhanced communication, urbanization and rationalization of political and 
societal institutions as leading to more universalistic principles and more cosmopolitan 
identities and commitments.  According to Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, young urban 
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residents, people with greater occupational status and higher educational attainment, 
persons involved in non-traditional organizations and associations should also be more 
tolerant, as should those most exposed to the wider, more cosmopolitan world.  On the 
other hand, they state that, “strong religious and traditional values are seen as 
providing support for political intolerance and violence as well as the nationalist political 
agendas…” (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p. 1535).  So modernization’s positive 
impact on political tolerance is based in the compelling effects of national diversity, 
urbanism, mixed family structures, gender equality and participation in formal 
organizations it promotes. 
In their study of the 1989 census of the former Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Sekulic and Massey study the effects of social status characteristics and the 
support they provide for the modernization theory.  They find that education levels and 
occupational differences have only a “modest dampening effect on intolerance… 
remarkably flat” (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p.1537).  On the other hand, they 
report that intermarriage, urbanism, social participation and the decline in religiosity are 
all more important in generating greater tolerance.  This study could prove particularly 
interesting for this research paper, as it concludes that Yugoslavian state policies of 
modernization and “controlled nationalism” (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p. 
1554), may have led to greater tolerance, but it has also set the stage for the “…political 
mobilization of groups around nationality, especially within nationally diverse and highly 
autonomous republics and provinces” (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p. 1554).  The 
study continues to show that the economic crisis of the 1980’s and the “…decline of 
federal Communist party influence (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p. 1555) gave 
rise to newly formed nationally based political appeals. 
Many changes associated with modernization, do indeed lead to greater political 
tolerance; but other aspects still exist, that readily create the potential for heightened 
inter-group conflict over scarce economic and political resources. 
Needler, while studying the relationship between political development and 
socio-economic development, takes the national GNP per capita as an indicator to 
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(although weakly) confirm his hypothesis that political development correlates with 
economic development. 
Modernization theory states that industrialization and its associated political and 
occupational transformations imparts greater universalism and acceptance of ethnic 
and national differences; “general effects of modernization on socio-political 
participation are more important in generating increased tolerance than the effects of 
industrialization on education and the occupational structure…” (Hodson, Sekulic and 
Massey, 1994, p.1547) 
Stevenson and Morrison, in their work, offer converging evidence that increased 
modernization decreases the probability of political instability.  They show evidence of 
increasing national income or secondary school enrolment that consistently leads to the 
decreasing probabilities of communal and therefore political instability.  They go on to 
suggest that; “…modernization does inhibit political instability, but only if it is a constant 
feature of national development over time…,…sustained modernization, if not 
obstructed by political mismanagement, will facilitate the regulation and moderation of 
conflicts…” (Morrison and Stevenson, 1972, p.97) 
If we were to define the modernization theory within the political instability 
discourse as we did in the text above, we should not forget to try and define the political 
instability itself; as a condition in national political systems in which the institutionalized 
patterns of authority break down; “the expected compliance to political authorities is 
replaced by violence intended to change the personnel, policies, or sovereignty of the 
political authorities by injury to persons or property.” (Morrison and Stevenson, 1972, 
p.94) 
 
4.3 Socio-Economic Rank and Behavior 
 
Social theorists widely agree that people’s values and beliefs usually go in line 
with their behavior, and socio-economic rank is highly associated with nearly every kind 
of behavior.  Louis Kriesberg states that socio-political behavior is affected not only by 
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the currently held set of values and beliefs, but also by the current situation, i.e. “the 
social and non-social constraints and pressures which limit the available alternatives” 
(Kriesberg, 1963, p.335). 
He highlights two important relationships between socio-economic rank and 
(political) behavior; Cultural and Situational. The first is defined by the societal 
transmission of values and beliefs which determine the behavior and the “class 
subculture with an integrated system of values, beliefs and behavior patterns” 
(Kriesberg, 1963, p.347).  Second, the situational explanation is that there are no 
differences in values and beliefs and that the differences in behavior are the direct 
result of different (social or economical) opportunities. 
 In the case of the political behavior, theorists widely agree that socio-economic 
status (with the emphasis on high education) is highly connected to the types of 
expressed behavior, but also stress the fact that it is”…likely to be attributed to the 
situational factors and is characterized by high consensus of relevant and acceptable 
concepts within the society” (Putnik, 2004, p.41). 
 
4.4 Human Needs Theory and Political Violence 
 
Persistent and repeated, unprovoked behavior that causes extreme harm is 
defined as violent (Staub defines it as evil).  This kind of behavior develops under the 
instigating conditions within the political society and is characterized by e.g. difficult life 
conditions, group conflicts, societal processes, frustration of basic human needs and 
their destructive fulfillment.  “In both groups and individuals, extreme violence 
originates with the frustration of basic human needs and the destructive modes of its 
fulfillment” (Staub, 1999, p.179).  It is often that violence begins when the frustration of 
basic human needs is combined with later frustration.  As psychological theories 
confirm, all human beings have certain shared psychological needs that must be fulfilled 
if we are to lead reasonably satisfying lives, security, positive identity, control of what is 
essential to us, connection to other people, independence and understanding of the 
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world and our place in it.  There are various theories and views on human needs 
(Burton, Kelman, and Maslow, just to name the few; in Staub, 1999, p.180.) but they all 
come together on these above mentioned factors.  If a person cannot fulfill these needs 
in a constructive manner, it will engage in a “destructive psychological process and 
actions” (Staub, 1999, p.179) to satisfy them.  Destructive need satisfaction means that 
one basic need is satisfied in a way in the long run will interfere with the satisfaction of 
other needs. 
In understanding violence in the group, it is important to consider both 
influences at the level of the group (culture, political system and political processes, the 
role of leaders, group psychological processes) and the individual. 
Life conditions in a society are the important factor when studying the violent 
political behavior and its origination.  Intense economic problems or political conflict, 
great social changes or the combination of the two profoundly frustrates basic needs.  
These societal problems “…give rise to psychological and social processes that turn 
individuals and sub-groups of society against each other” (Staub, 1999, p.183). 
Individuals turn to groups for identities and connection “while they scapegoat 
some other groups, (they) adopt or create destructive ideologies and hopeful visions of 
social arrangements…that identify enemies who supposedly stand in the way of the 
fulfillment of these visions” (Staub, 1999, p.186).  We could be able to attribute this type 
of behavior to the human psycho-sociological tendency to differentiate between the in-
group and the out-group.  These processes provide possibilities of control and new 
understandings of reality (usually, ideologies are especially effective for the fulfillment 
of basic needs are a part of collective violence).  Among the frustrations of basic needs, 
instigators of political and personal violence could be conflicts of interest, like 
intractable conflicts over the attachment to the territory, access to resources, power, or 
fear of the other. 
When extreme (political) violence occurs, individuals and groups are prone to 
change as a result of that violence, they usually change in a way that makes “…future 
violence greater, easier and more likely” (Staub, 1999, p.190).  Victims are devaluated 
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and deprived of rights, seen as less human and removed from the grips of ethics and 
morality.  Usual values and principles are replaced with higher priority values derived 
from ideologies.  It is usually not uncommon for one to observe these unfortunate 
trends over a long historical period (Middle East, Turkey, Balkans, Medieval Europe, 
South Africa, Japan, USA etc…).  Once devaluation becomes the part of the culture 
(literature, arts, and media) and is perpetuated in social institutions and when it enables 
institutionalized discriminations it becomes highly resistant to change.  “Even when its 
public expression is relatively quiescent for a period of time, as it was…during the Tito 
era in the former Yugoslavia, it often remains part of the deep structure of the culture 
and can re-emerge when instigating conditions for violence are present” (Staub, 1999, 
p.191). 
All societies honor certain degree of respect and obedience to authority.  Straub 
stresses that when respect and unquestioning obedience are overemphasized the 
potential for a destructive socio-political process intensifies.  In many cases of extreme 
structural violence (genocide, mass killings, etc.) the society has been characterized by 
strong respect for authority (Kressel, 1996, p. 34).  Obviously, strong respect to 
authority makes obedience to authoritative immoral orders more likely; when these 
kinds of policies and practices are institutionalized people will be less willing to oppose 
the authorities and the rest of the group (Staub, 1999, p.184). 
Another important characteristic that predisposes political violence and social 
conflict is the “unhealed wounds” in a society; when a group has experienced great 
suffering, especially due to persecution and violence at the hands of others, it is more 
likely to respond to renewed threat with extreme violence (Staub, 1999, p.185), e.g. Ex-
Yugoslavia, Middle East, etc… 
 
4.4.1 Individual vs. Group violence 
 
According to Staub, group violence is a societal process, and some of the 
perpetrators that take part and participate in group violence on a more personal level 
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would be unlikely to become violent as individuals.  People with developed strong 
authority-oriented respect, frustrated childhood needs and adverse wide ranging 
personal wounds are usually likely to be involved in this type of violence, as these 
frustrations may be activated by the conditions that instigate group violence. 
Needs for identity, connection and low self-esteem prove to be the incentives to 
join into the violently-ideological groups.  However, once a group is formed, Staub 
states, “…system of careerism takes place…desire to advance in the system, to gain 
respect from like-minded others, to be a good member of the group, is…important 
motivation.” (Staub, 1999, p.188) 
 As in a group, individual violent political behavior is often the joint outcome of 
the socio-political conditions and culture (exp. relationship among individuals, specific 
instigators).  Attention to the different levels of influence of predisposing conditions and 
instigators is essential to understanding (and preventing) such violence.  Violent political 
behavior serves the satisfaction of basic and profound human needs that are imperative 
in character, when such needs are frustrated in the life of individuals (and groups), 
destructive modes of satisfaction are developed; the nature of individuals, culture and 
the socio-political system of a group may lead to the heightened probability of politically 
unaccepted violence (Burton, 1990, p.189). 
 
4.5 Property Rights, Need Satisfaction and Conflict 
 
Differing from the concepts of self-maximization, where the origins of the 
political violence and conflict were unmet basic needs, sources of intractable and violent 
political conflict are also property rights (to often scarce goods).  When the good in 
question is the resource base that both groups claim necessary for their survival, 
capacities for generating political conflict intensifies.  This political-philosophy discourse 
views right as a “enforceable entitlement to pursue one’s interest strategically, they do 
not immediately refer to individuals or group who are set against one another, mutual 
recognition (of the other) is constitutive for a legal order from which actionable right is 
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derived.” (Noonan, 2004, p. 9)  While group differences are recognized as constitutive of 
individual citizens, the citizens themselves must recognize their obligations to the 
universality of the law.  It is only when these rights are mutually recognized on both 
sides in conflict that legislative decisions can be understood and accepted as an 
extension of that mutually accepted (political) system (Kymlicka 1995, in Noonan 2004, 
p.16). 
The way I try to accommodate the above mentioned theory in a way that relates 
to the research question of this study is as follows: The higher the level of self 
understanding (and a level of socio-political life) between the two competing groups, 
and the more equally distributed balance of power (between the groups) over the 
competing resources, the higher the possibility of acceptable socio-political behavior 
that consequently positively influences the judicial and legal resolving of conflicts and 
reduces the combat propensity of individuals and groups.  Equality (balance of power) 
and mutual recognition (of needs) is always at the very foundation of the values in the 


















5. EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
 The administered surveys collected the quantitative data on different 
demographic characteristics of the population, more precisely; it describes the 
representative sample on eight different socio-economic variables; Age, marital status, 
number of children, number of supported persons in the household, education, 
occupation, monthly income and estimated net worth.  These were coded and than 
compared to the answers given to the two open ended questions supposed to 
determine the levels of political tolerance and socio-economic influence on combat 
propensity in civil conflicts. 
  
5.1 Enumeration Strategy and Sample Description 
 
The following section describes the representative sample in terms of the 
empirical demographic data gathered during the surveys of the non combatant 
population and their respective relations to the levels of political tolerance and possible 




The representative sample is divided in to five different age groups; 18-27 (1) 
















 When asked to confirm or dispute the provided hypothesis that people with 
more practical experience and less formal education are more likely to fight in the civil 
conflict, all seven (7) examinees of the first age group (18-27), both (five) Albanian and 
(two) Serbian agreed with and supported the hypothesis.  When asked to give their 
opinions about the conflict itself, its participants and the potential political resolution, 
they expressed highly non-tolerant political attitudes towards the opposing ethnic group 
and their political goals.  In the second age group (28-37), out of eight (8) examinees, 
four Serbian and four Albanian, four Serbians and three Albanians agreed with the 
proposed hypothesis and one Albanian disagreed, stating it was the other way around.  
When expressing opinions about the political tolerance and the conflict itself, three out 
of four Serbians expressed somewhat more tolerant attitudes than the previous age 
group, while one provided the non-tolerant views; out of four Albanians in this age 
group, two expressed more tolerant political attitudes, while the other two were 
politically intolerant.  The third age group (38-47), consisted of six (6) examinees, four 
(4) Serbian and two (2) Albanian.  Three out of four Serbians agreed with the proposed 
hypothesis and one disagreed, while one of the Albanians agreed and one disagreed.  
When asked about political tolerance one Serbian expressed politically tolerant views 
about the conflict and thee remained un-tolerant of the other side and their political 
goals, while one of the two Albanians was tolerant of the other side, the other one 
expressed politically intolerant views.  Age group (48-57) consisted of four (4) 
examinees, both two (2) Serb and two (2) Albanian.  Both Serbian examinees agreed 
with the proposed hypothesis and expressed intolerant political attitudes about the 
other side in the conflict, while one of the Albanian examinees agreed with the 
hypothesis and expressed tolerant attitudes towards other side, the other one failed to 
provide the answer to the proposed hypothesis and expressed intolerant political 
attitudes when asked about the conflict and its possible political resolution.  The last age 
group (58+) consisted of five (5) examinees, three (3) Serbian and two (2) Albanian.  Out 
of the three Serbian examines, two agreed with the proposed hypothesis and one failed 
to provide the answer; both Albanian examinees agreed with the hypothesis.  All three 
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Serbian examinees provided intolerant political attitudes and both Albanian examinees 
in contrast provided politically more tolerant attitudes about the conflict resolution.
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 5.1.2 Gender 
 
Gender ratios of the sample are presented in the graph below.  Representative 
sample consisted of twenty one (21) males and nine (9) females.  Out of the twenty one 
(21) males that completed the survey, ten (10) were ethnic Serbian and eleven (11) 
ethnic Albanian.  Out of nine (9) women, five (5) were ethnically Serbian and four (4) 












 Eight (8) out of nine (9) females that completed the survey agreed with the 
proposed hypothesis and only one (ethnic Albanian) disagreed; on the other hand, 
sixteen (16) out of twenty one (21) males (seven Serbian and nine Albanian) that 
completed the survey agreed with the hypothesis. 
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 When prompted about their political attitudes and the levels of tolerance they 
express towards the other side in the conflict, two out of five Serbian females and one 
out of four Albanian females expressed the more tolerant political attitudes about the 
conflicts solution and the other group, while the remaining six females expressed 
politically intolerant attitudes.  On the other hand, out of twenty one males, six (one 
Serbian and five Albanian) expressed politically tolerant attitudes towards the conflicts 
solutions and the other side, while the remaining fifteen expressed politically intolerant 
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 5.1.3 Marital Status 
 
Marital status of the sample is presented in the graph below; it consists of 
twelve (12) singles, seventeen (17) married persons and one (1) that is divorced.  Out of 
twelve singles, six are Serbian and six are Albanian and out of seventeen married 













All twelve of the singles agreed with the proposed hypothesis, while only one 
(Serbian) has expressed the tolerant views.  Out of seventeen married persons, eleven 
agreed with the proposed hypothesis (six Serbian and five Albanian), while four 
disagreed (one Serbian and three Albanian); two other persons failed to provide the 
valid answer.  Eight (six Serbian and two Albanian) out of seventeen married persons 
have expressed the intolerant political attitudes, while seven (two Serbian and five 
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Albanian) have expressed the tolerant political perceptions; two persons (one Serbian 
and one Albanian) failed to provide the valid answer. 
Percentage of the married 
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 5.1.4 Number of Children 
 
When it comes to the tolerance levels in political attitudes and the relationship 
to the proposed hypothesis in the survey, the number of children directly relates to the 
above examined variable of the marital status (this is due to the fact that all of the 
examinees that are married also had children), so I will just present the demographics of 
















 5.1.5 Number of Supported Persons 
 
In the following graph, the number of supported persons in the household is 
presented.  Vast majority of the representative sample, twenty people (eight Serbian 
and twelve Albanian) had no supported persons in their households; two (one Albanian 
and one Serbian) had one person in their household they supported; three persons (two 
Serbian and one Albanian) said that they support two persons; also three persons (all 
Serbian) have stated that they are responsible for supporting three persons in their 
households; and last, two more persons (one Serbian and one Albanian) reported that 
they are responsible for supporting four or more persons in their household (one of 












 Out of the twenty people with no supported persons in their household eighteen 
of them (eleven Albanian and seven Serbian) supported the hypothesis that people with 
more practical training and less formal education are more likely to fight in the civil 
conflict while two of them disagreed (one Albanian and one Serbian).  While out of the 
eight people with one to three supported persons in their households, four of them 
(three Serbian and one Albanian) agreed with the hypothesis, two of them (both 
Serbian) disagreed and two (one Albanian and one Serbian) failed to provide valid 
answers.  Out of the persons that supported four or more persons in their home, one 
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 With respect to the political attitudes and tolerance levels exhibited by the 
people that had no supported persons in their households, thirteen out of twenty (seven 
Serbian and six Albanian) expressed the intolerant political views and five (one Serbian 
and four Albanian) of them expressed more positive and tolerant political attitudes; 
among the eight persons with one to three supported people in their households, seven 
of them (four Serbian and three Albanian) presented intolerant political views and 
attitudes, while three of them (two Serbian and one Albanian) expressed the more 
tolerant and acceptable political behavior.  Both (Serbian and Albanian) of the persons 
in the sample that reported four or more supported persons in their households held 




Percentage of people with no 
supported persons in their 




Percentage of the people with 1-3 
supported persons in their 





Percentage of the people with 4+ 
supported persons in their 






 5.1.6 Education 
 
The following graph presents the demographic of the sample with respect to the 
education levels.  It shows that out of the total of thirty people that were represented in 
the sample, twelve of them (eight Albanian and four Serbian) have completed the 
elementary school education or the equivalent of.  None of the persons in the sample 
has had any formal education whatsoever.  Total of nine people (six Albanian and three 
Serbian) have completed the high school education and nine of them (eight Serbian and 

















 Among the twelve people that have completed the education level equivalent to 
the elementary school, eight of them (two Serbian and six Albanian) agree with the 
proposed hypothesis, two of them disagree (one Serbian and one Albanian) and two 
more have failed to provide valid answers (one Serbian and one Albanian).  Out of the 
nine people that have completed high school, eight of them (three Serbian and five 
Albanian) agree with the hypothesis and one (Albanian) of them disagrees with the 
hypothesis proposed in the survey.  Eight (seven Serbian and one Albanian) out of nine 
people with completed University education levels or higher agree with the hypothesis 
and one (Serbian) disagrees. 
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 Out of the twelve persons that have completed elementary education level in 
the representative sample, seven (three Serbian and four Albanian) of them expressed 
intolerant political attitudes, while four of them (three Albanian and one Serbian) is 
considered politically tolerant and one (Albanian) fails to provide the valid answer.  
Among the nine persons with completed high school level of education, six of them 
(three Serbian and three Albanian) expressed intolerant political behavior and three 
(Albanian) of them are considered politically tolerant.  Among the part of the sample 
that is most highly educated, seven (six Serbian and one Albanian) out of nine expressed 
politically intolerant views while two (Serbian) conveyed more politically tolerant 
attitudes, as presented in the graphs below. 
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Following section describes the sample with its relation to the income levels.  
Four persons (three Albanian and one Serbian) have income levels lower than one 
hundred euros per month; thirteen (seven Serbian and six Albanian) between one and 
three hundred euros; nine (six Serbian and three Albanian) have reported their income 
levels between three hundred and one thousand euros per month; two (one Serbian 
and one Albanian) above one thousand euros; while two (Albanian) persons failed to 




















 All four persons whose income level is under one hundred euros per month 
agreed with the hypothesis presented in the survey.  Nine (five Serbian and four 
Albanian) out of thirteen persons whose income in between one and three hundred 
euros agreed with the hypothesis and two (one Serbian and one Albanian) disagreed, 
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while two (one Serbian and one Albanian) failed to provide valid answers.  Among nine 
people that have shared income between three hundred and one thousand euros per 
month, seven (five Serbian and two Albanian) agreed with the hypothesis, while two 
(one Albanian and one Serbian) disagreed.  Both (one Serbian and one Albanian) persons 
that earn more than one thousand euros per month agreed with the proposed 
hypothesis. 
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 Three (two Albanian and one Serbian) out of four persons that reported income 
less than one hundred euros per month held intolerant political attitudes and one 
(Albanian) of them expressed politically tolerant behavior.  Among the thirteen people 
whose monthly income was between one and three hundred euros per month, nine 
(five Serbian and four Albanian) of them had intolerant political attitudes, while four 
(two Albanian and two Serbian) held more tolerant political attitudes.  Six (one Albanian 
and five Serbian) people among the group whose monthly income is between three 
hundred and one thousand euros expressed politically intolerant attitudes, two (one 
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Serbian and one Albanian) of them expressed politically tolerant attitudes, while one 
(Albanian) failed to provide a valid answer.  Out of the two persons whose income 
exceeds one thousand euros per month; one (Serbian) held politically intolerant 
attitudes and the other (Albanian) expressed politically tolerant views. 
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 5.1.8 Properties Owned (Net Worth) 
 
 Out of the thirty persons in the representative sample, four (three Albanian and 
one Serbian) of them have their accumulative properties owned valued less then one 
thousand euros; ten (six Serbian and four Albanian) report their material assets to be 
worth somewhere between one and five thousand euros; while eight (seven Serbian and 
one Albanian) estimate their net worth total in between five and twenty thousand 
euros; three (two Serbian and one Albanian) said that their properties owned exceed 
twenty thousand euros and five (four Albanian and one Serbian) have failed to provide 




















 All four (three Albanian and one Serbian) people that have reported their 
properties owned to be valued less than one thousand euros agreed with the hypothesis 
that people with more practical training and less formal education are more likely to 
fight in the civil conflict.  Out of ten people whose material assets are between one and 
five thousand euros, seven (three Serbian and four Albanian) of them agreed with the 
proposed hypothesis, two disagreed (one Albanian and one Serbian), while one 
(Albanian) did not provide a valid answer.  Seven (six Serbian and one Albanian) out of 
eight people whose assets are valued from five to twenty thousand euros agreed with 
the hypothesis presented in the survey, while one (Serbian) failed to give an applicable 
answer.  Two (one Serbian and one Albanian) out of three persons that report their 
properties owned worth more than twenty thousand euros agreed with the hypothesis, 
while one (Serbian) disagreed.  
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 All four (one Serbian and three Albanian) persons in the sample that report 
assets owned less then one thousand euros held politically intolerant attitudes.  Six (two 
Serbian and four Albanian) out of ten people whose assets are valued between one and 
five thousand euros held intolerant political attitudes and four (two Serbian and two 
Albanian) of them expressed more tolerant political views of the other and the conflict.  
Seven (Serbian) persons amongst eight who evaluate their assets somewhere in 
between five and twenty thousand euros held intolerant political attitudes while only 
one (Albanian) expressed politically tolerant perspective.  And while two (Serbian) 
people whose assets exceed twenty thousand euros held intolerant political views, one 
(Albanian) person in that group held politically tolerant attitudes. 
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 5.2 Key Patterns 
 
Here we will briefly glance and notice the number of demographic patterns that 
emerged from reviewing the data of the representative sample.  As already mentioned 
earlier in the text, variables for the marital status and the number of children directly 
relate to one another due to the fact that all of the examinees that are married also had 
children.  Also there is an obvious link between the number of children and the number 
of supported persons in the household, especially among the age groups of twenty eight 
to thirty seven and thirty eight to forty seven years old, as children of these age groups 
still tend to be of young age and are obviously still supported by their parents.  As 
expected, a direct link exists between the variables that represent the demographic of 
the sample for education, income and properties owned. 
 
 5.3 Interviews 
 
As mentioned in the earlier part of the text that deals with methodology, three 
types of interviews were administrated, all designed to gather as much qualitative data 
as possible.  The first involved two (2) ex-combatants, one (1) ethnic Serb and one (1) 
ethnic Albanian that were closely and actively involved in the civil conflict.  I have met 
with both of them through my NGO contacts that work and are extensively present in 
the region; Second two (2) high ranking NGO officers, one (1) ethnic Serb and one (1) 
ethnic Albanian that were actively involved in the data gathering about the fighting and 
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identifying both the civilian and military victims of the conflict; and the Third two (2) K-
FOR officers, stationed in Kosovo, both with extensive operational experience and 
knowledge of the Balkans. 
During the interviews, the focus is placed on the following issues; on the 
mechanisms for recruitment, motivation for participation, political preferences before 
the war, during the peace negotiations and today after the conflict.  I tried to examine 
and take a deeper look into the command structure of the forces, economic resources 
available (before, during and after the conflict), length of the combatant involvement, 
interaction and the treatment of the civilians, disarmament and reintegration into the 
post-war society.  Also, the same two open ended questions intended to measure the 
levels of political tolerance and socio economic influence on combat propensity (in civil 
conflicts), that were administered in the survey taken by the non-combatants, were 
asked again. 
Given the interviewees common political and occupational perceptions the data 




Ex-Combatant A, Albanian (born in 1979) from the region near the town of 
Prizren, has no children of his own and has completed eight grades of Elementary 
School.  He has joined the fighting voluntarily and was recruited in to the force by a 
longtime acquaintance from a neighboring municipality.  He claims he never received 
any material compensation for his participation in the conflict and that his motives for 
involvement were to help to create a “new and free Kosovo”, he was never involved, 
affiliated or in any way participated in a any event connected to any political party.  He 
left the conflict actively in year 2000 after almost one year of “service” and has returned 
to his village but now lives in the outskirts of Pristina with his relatives.  Currently he has 




He declined to closely and more directly discuss his active combat involvement 
and tactical operations during that time but has claimed that the command structure in 
his unit was same as it is in the Army and that he never encountered any maltreatment 
of civilian population although he has heard many different stories from various people 
in other units.  He states that after his disarmament, reintegration in to the post war 
society is still “an ongoing process for him” but he has coped with it pretty well. 
When asked for his opinion about the proposed hypothesis concerning 
relationship between formal education and active combat involvement he strongly 
disagreed and has replied that “in his opinion and from his experiences, people with 
more education always do better in the civil conflict by using the people that are less 
educated than them.” 
In terms of his personal viewpoint on the political conflict he states that it is the 
right of the Kosovo Albanians to create their own future free of Serbian influences and 
that for him only acceptable solution can be the “Independent Kosovo.” 
Ex-Combatant B, Serbian (born in 1974) is a high school graduate from the town 
of Pancevo near Belgrade, is divorced and has one child living in Belgrade with his 
mother.  He has participated in the conflict actively as a regular member of the Serbian 
special police units and today is stationed near the city of Novi Sad.  He declined to give 
specific time frames as to when he was stationed in Kosovo.  Currently he is employed 
full time within the Serbian ministry of interior. 
When asked about the motives for his active participation in the conflict he said 
it was his “duty to defend his country and the civilian population from the terrorists.”  He 
clearly stated that he never received any kind of special compensation or incentive for 
his active engagement in the fighting; and when asked about the treatment of civilians 
during the conflict he replied that the command structure of the Serbian government 
forces has always had necessary and successful mechanisms for protection of the 
civilian population. 
When asked to provide his opinion about the proposed hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between formal education and active combat involvement he stated that 
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“Freedom has no price” and that education should not matter when it comes to the 
conflicts like the one fought in Kosovo. 
In terms of his personal viewpoint on the political background of the conflict he 
stated that the “West” is supporting the “wrong” side in the conflict and that the 
“United States and its corrupt government together with the Albanian lobby in the US” is 
to blame for the expulsion of Serbs and the current violent political developments in the 
province.  He sees the hope for the future of Serbian existence in Kosovo in the hands of 
the Russia and China and their powers to veto in the UN Security Council and blames the 
international community for allowing the expulsion of almost all of the Serbian 
population of Kosovo under their direct supervision after the signing of the 1244 UN 
resolution. 
 
5.3.2 NGO Officers 
 
Due to the specific time limitations during the fieldwork, interviews with both 
NGO officers were conducted together and therefore the answers provided were 
generally uniform and here are presented as such. 
The interviewed NGO officers worked closely on issues of human right abuses 
and data gathering for war crimes investigations conducted by the International War 
Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.  They are both currently employed full time as 
consultants on Transitional Justice.  NGO officer A is a university educated Albanian 
male from Pristina (Born in 1974) and NGO officer B is a university educated Serbian 
female from Belgrade (Born in 1973). 
They both state the opinion that the conflict in Kosovo “has been motivated with 
economic, ethnic and religious causes.”  They also stress the fact that the majority of the 
combat-active participants of the conflict came from the rural and un(der)developed 
areas.  This also added a specifically problematic issue of Urban vs. Rural dynamic and 
perspective to the conflict where, they state, “this complicated situation on the field 
after the conflict was politically concluded as it (created) increased animosities between 
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the two groups.”   When it comes to the final political status for the (Kosovo) province, 
they believe that the final status will result in some from of the provisional 
independence under the supervision of the international community (UN, EU, NATO, G8, 
etc…). 
They declined to talk in full depth about the supposed economic and educational 
demographic of the combat active participants as they never conducted a specific 
(scientific) research on the issue, but providing their best “guess” and from their own 
experience, they suspected that vast majority of them would have come from the 
groups with low levels of income and formal education. 
When faced with the proposed hypothesis concerning the levels of formal 
education and active combat engagement they replied cautiously affirmative stating 
that people with low levels of formal education are more inclined of being persuaded by 
nationalistic politicians’ rhetoric.  It is easier to manipulate people without formal 
education or with less formal education since they are not inclined to question motives, 
statements, or attitudes of politicians.  They also stressed the importance of the fact 
that potential combat propensity also depends on where the people live, actually 
whether they are living in ethnically mixed communities and whether they come into 
contact with people of different ethnic origin. 
In addition, interviewees were also asked to numerically rate the specific 
variables presented to them (Age, Gender, Education, Religion, Economic Status 
(Wealth), Background (Family upbringing), Past experiences, Residence (Urban/Rural)) 
with respect to their influence on Political tolerance, starting with the strongest (1) and 
ending with the weakest (8), respectively.  Their answers are shown below: 










5.3.3 KFOR Officers 
 
Both K-FOR officers were stationed in Kosovo and their active service in the 
Balkan Peninsula dates back as early as the first peacekeeping missions in 1991; this fact 
provides them with extensive operational experience and knowledge of the Balkans and 
provides invaluable and much needed expertise and insight relatable to the core subject 
of this research project. 
 Much the same as in the case of the NGO representatives; and due to the 
specific situational constraints during the fieldwork, interviews with the KFOR officers 
were conducted simultaneously and here are presented as such.  KFOR officer A is a 
University educated Norwegian male (born in 1969) and KFOR officer B is a University 
educated Finnish male (born in 1967). 
 Based on their individual experiences and professional expertise they describe 
the recent conflict in Kosovo and the two confronted sides as: 
”UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army) seemed to take advantage out of international media 
support and they learned how to manipulate the public opinion through western news agencies. 
They cried for help pretending to be innocent and poor victims of Serbian aggressions. They 
managed to turn their activities to look like pure self defense against an overwhelming enemy, 
and by doing that they gained compassion among human rights activists all over the world. In 
other parts of the world, in other similar conflicts, these actions (ambushes and attacks against 
legally elected and confessed government authorities) would have been condemned and 
described as terrorist behavior.  On the other hand, Serbs seemed to be too self confident, selfish 
and arrogant towards the western world and therefore they used excess power for putting down 
the rebellions. By more discreet diplomacy and more professional media handling they could 
have turned the Albanian extremist actions to be seen as real threat against an European 
government and their counter actions could have been more justified in “the eyes of the world”.  
Overflowing nationalism and anger against western politics (NATO, USA, EU etc) in the 
aftermath of previous conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, blinded the Serbs to see the political 
realism and diplomatic professionalism.” 
 They both agreed with the proposed hypothesis concerning the relationship 
between the combat active propensity and the levels of formal education stressing the 
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fact that: “It is very often the case, that in the war the human values turn upside down.  'Bad 
guys' take the power over from the 'good guys'. The most recognized human values are 
callousness, hardness and toughness. So called 'soft values' are seen as signs of weakness and 
during a conflict there is no room for weakness. It has been like this since the beginning of the 
times. This is directly comparable to the respect for formal education during peace time in a 
civilized community.” 
 Proceeding, we continued to profoundly and in more detail discuss the issues 
concerning the recruitment, suspected demographics (economic and educational) and 
motivations for joining of the combat forces, their command structures and interaction 
with the civilian population.  They discussed that deriving from their own experiences 
people with less formal education tend to be more “hard-core” and “brutal” and “gung-
ho” mindsets and that the higher officers (probably more educated) were easier to 
communicate with.  When talking about the forces and their structures they stated that 
the Serb forces they encountered were highly (well)trained and experienced as they 
have (large numbers of them) been involved in the recent conflicts dated as far back as 
active involvements in 1991 and that combat motivation (as well as reputation) among 
them was extremely high; they also went on to say that some of the elite Serbian forces 
had an extremely “mean” reputation in creating fear and terror among the Albanian 
forces, using the term “married to the conflict.”  When talking about the Albanian 
forces, they stress the importance of the US and international media support backing, 
deep routed and organized criminal element with concern to the funding and among 
the leaders of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and the local mass hysteria created in 
the villages and rural areas; which they described as the situationally relatable to the 
notions “either with, or against us” leaving the no choice of being left out because of the 
local (sometimes extremely criminal) pressures.  When discussing the command 
structures, outside of the Serbian army and police forces and the usual military 
command structures, and with regards to the Albanian combat element they emphasize 
the existence of the “jungle law” in some local units, meaning that the persons who 
were more powerful or know to be aggressive before the conflict remained in power 
which in turn more often than not created certain operational and command problems 
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in these units.  They underscored the fact that the criminal element unfortunately 
played and continues to play an important role during the conflict; but even now in the 
“post war” Kosovo society stating that past conflicts have only made them stronger and 
that their (political) influences grew to the extent that some of them have became, due 
to the lack of the stable civil society institutions in today’s Kosovo, “legitimate” 
politicians on the newly created Kosovo political scene. 
Concerning the treatment of the civilian population they both confirmed the 
reports of the high numbers of refugees, stating that most of the Serbian population has 
fled to Serbia proper and that the Albanian population has also migrated but not to the, 
percent wise, same extent as the Serb residents; but have declined to discuss in more 























 This section will portray the summarized empirical data categories form the 
representative sample described in the previous chapter and make a conscious effort to 
present them in the light of the theoretical concepts and professional opinions 
introduced earlier the text. 
 
6.1 Analysis of the Representative Sample Description 
 
 This part of the text will depict crucial patterns and relationships in the 
representative sample and provide some likely causes underlying these trends and, 
when applicable, their potential connection to the proposed hypothesis that people 
with more practical experience and less formal education are more likely to fight in a 
civil conflict and their relationship to political attitudes and the expressed levels of 
political tolerance. 
 
 6.1.1 Age 
 
When looking at the age of the representative sample and the relationship it has 
with the proposed hypothesis (that people with more practical experience and less 
formal education are more likely to fight in a civil conflict) and the expressed levels of 
political tolerance, we see the trend of agreeing with the proposed suggestion with 
twenty five (25) out of the thirty (30) examinees agree with the above mentioned 
assumption.  We fail to see any strong differentiation among the five different age 
groups; this can maybe be attributed to the relevantly small size of the representative 
sample, but we can observe that the examinees of the two youngest age groups 
sampled (18-27 and 28-37 years old) and the two oldest (48-57 and 58 and older) 
completely agree with the assumed hypothesis while in the age groups consisting of 
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people between thirty eight (38) and forty seven (47) years old that ratio is slightly 
skewed to two (2) to one (1) in favor of the agreement with the hypothesis. 
When it comes to the measured levels of the expressed political tolerance and 
its relationship to the age of the representative sample we can observe a slightly 
different trend and distancing from the results provided concerning the above 
mentioned high percentage of consent with the proposed hypothesis; we observed a 
trend of political intolerance towards the other ethnic group or legitimacy of their 
political goals, only age group that stands against that generalization of the interpreted 
data is the age group ranging from twenty eight (28) to thirty seven (37) years old, 
where the ratio is almost two (2) to one (1) in favor of the tolerant political views and 
attitudes expressed toward the other ethnic group; the remaining four age groups 
express intolerant political opinions, the youngest age group (18-27 years old) being the 
most intolerant in their political views and perceptions of the other ethnicity. 
Political tolerance theory does support the fact that as a variable in determining 
the levels of political tolerance age does impact the levels of political tolerance 
(Golebiowska, 1995, p. 23) directly and indirectly by influencing certain values that later 
can have some bearing on the levels of political tolerance; but it fails to offer the specific 
age groups that are more prone to the political tolerance (or intolerance) which could 
than be cross referenced with the findings of our study.  In our study by observing the 
above mentioned and described patterns of the sample selection we can very cautiously 
and without generalization become aware of the fact that the examinees of the 
youngest age group do tend to express politically more intolerant attitudes than the 
older correspondents.  This notion could also be attributed to the past personal 
experiences (which affects youngest population the most) as well as the fact that the 
local society does not impart the certain values that would promote political tolerance 
that would than in turn lead to, in line with the modernization theory of Hodson, more 
universalistic principles, more cosmopolitan identities and commitments and to 






Comparing the gender ratios of the representative sample and its relationship 
regarding the agreement or disagreement with the proposed hypothesis; we observe a 
trend showing that the women do tend to agree with the hypothesis (nine out of ten 
females agreed with the proposed hypothesis; 90%) more than men do (sixteen out of 
twenty one males agreed with the proposed hypothesis; 76%).  As this work fails to 
incorporate any gender related theories of political tolerance but focuses on the socio – 
economic influences on combat propensity we will confide our discussion within the 
entrusted theoretical concepts introduced earlier in the text; according to Golebiowska, 
gender is among the “sources” that directly or through the impact on certain values 
indirectly influence social or political attitudes, assuming, as our results have shown that 
certain values traditionally do tend to be more closely connected with the specific 
gender. 
On the other hand, when it comes to the political attitudes and the levels of 
political tolerance demonstrated towards the other group, we see the certain uniformity 
in results obtained which state that only thirty three percent of females (three out of 
nine, 33.3%) and twenty eight percent of males (six out twenty one, 28.6%) expressed 
politically tolerant attitudes failing to show the direct and clear link between gender and 
political tolerance levels. 
 
6.1.3 Marital Status and the Number of Children 
 
Concerning the marital status and the number of children being tested variables 
in the study, as explained in the earlier portion of the text, researched expressed 
tolerance levels in political attitudes and the relationship to the proposed hypothesis in 
the survey is directly connected and the results from both variables match exactly, 
hence here will be presented together.  This is simply due to the fact that all of the 
examinees that are married also had children and that none of the single participants of 
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the study had children.  In the introduced theoretical concepts intended for this study, 
we fail to find any proposed concepts to directly reference our results for these two 
researched variables; Nevertheless, we observed a trend where single persons 
completely agreed with the proposed hypothesis (all twelve single persons, 100%) while 
out of the seventeen (17) married persons, sixty four percent agreed (eleven out of 
seventeen, 64.7%) and twenty three percent disagreed with the proposed hypothesis 
(four out of seventeen, 23.5%), while the remaining failed to provide a valid answer.  
Regarding the levels of political tolerance, we can witness that single persons expressed 
highly intolerant political attitudes towards the other group with ninety one percent 
(eleven out of twelve, 91.6%) expressing the intolerant political views of the other, while 
the married people conveyed as more politically tolerant with forty one percent of the 
sample (seven out of seventeen, 41.2%) with tolerant attitudes and with forty seven 
percent of the sample (eight out of seventeen, 47.1%) expressing intolerant political 
views, while the rest failed to provide valid answers.  We could tentatively assume some 
potential causes for why this is so; according to Golebiowska and her theory of political 
tolerance, certain values do impart political tolerance, and assumedly, the set of values 
and priorities held by the married portion of the sample and persons with children could 
acutely genuinely differ from the sets of values and priorities held by the other part 
(singles) of the representative sample and could lead to the possible explanation of the 
results obtained. 
 
6.1.4 Number of Supported Persons 
 
Somewhat in line with the section above, with regard to the number of 
supported persons as a tested variable in the study we find that the vast majority of the 
representative sample, sixty six percent of the sample (twenty out of thirty persons, 
66.6%) had no supported persons in their households, and the rest thirty three percent 
(ten out of thirty, 33.3%) had one or more persons supported in their homes.  Referring 
back to the theoretical framework of this study we fail to directly connect this 
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researched variable to any of the presented concepts; but while looking at the empirical 
data we can observe the trend where the people with no supported persons in their 
households do tend to agree with the proposed hypothesis in much higher percentage 
(eighteen out of twenty, 90%) than the people surveyed that do have one or more 
supported members in their households (five out of ten, 50%).  In contrast, when 
looking over the levels of expressed political tolerance, we find that both, sample 
representatives with no supported persons in their households (thirteen out of twenty, 
65%) and people with supported members within their households (seven out of ten, 
70%) hold intolerant political attitudes towards the other side. 
 
6.1.5 Education  
 
In tentative support of the theoretical concepts presented here, our sample 
results show a gradual statistical shift from; 66% (eight out of twelve) of the people with 
completed elementary school or lower do agree with the proposed hypothesis, to a bit 
higher level of 88% (sixteen out of eighteen) with completed high school and higher 
levels of formal education that agree with the proposed hypothesis.  When it comes to 
the expressed levels of political tolerance our results fail to show a strong link between 
the levels of formal education and tolerance.  In our representative sample, 58% (seven 
out of twelve) people with the elementary education levels express intolerant political 
attitudes, while 72% (thirteen out of eighteen) of the sample belonging to the group 
with higher levels of formal education (completed high school and above) expressed 
intolerant political attitudes. 
 In reviewed theoretical concepts regarding this study we have observed the 
emphasis of the salutary effects of education on the levels of political tolerance 
(Golebiowska 1995, Sullivan 1985).  According to them, education influences individual 
value priorities and consequently imparts openness and commitments to political 
diversity and greater social tolerance.  All things being equal, higher educational 
attainment according to Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, should lead to more tolerant 
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individual and political attitudes, but this is indeed influenced by other factors (exp. 
levels of religiosity and traditional values).   According to their study and interpretation 
of Modernization Theory, education has "modest, dampening effect on tolerance..., 
remarkably flat" (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p. 1537).  In the case of the 
political behavior, theorists widely agree that socio-economic status (with the emphasis 
on high education) is highly connected to the types of expressed behavior, but also 
stress the fact that it is”…likely to be attributed to the situational factors and is 
characterized by high consensus of relevant and acceptable concepts within the society” 
(Putnik, 2004, p. 41). 
 
6.1.6 Income and Net Worth 
 
In addition to just above mentioned, Inglehart suggests that people brought up 
under different economic conditions are likely to demonstrate different “value 
priorities” (Inglehart, 1990, p. 95).  According to Inglehart, economic prosperity creates a 
sense of personal security that manifests itself in a decline of “vulnerability to the 
external environment” (Inglehart, 1990, p. 306).  This sense of security, when physical 
survival is assured, generally leads to greater tolerance towards diversity than usually 
exhibited in the cases where the competition for survival is present.  Economic security, 
according to Flanagan, then leads to openness and opening to new ideas and accepting 
attitudes towards broader range of behavior and increased levels of tolerance. 
 Furthermore, here we present Income and Net Worth, both economic variables, 
as they relate to the theoretical concepts stated above.  The majority of our 
representative sample, regardless of their Income levels of Economic Net Worth, agrees 
with the proposed hypothesis that people with more practical experience and less 
formal education are more likely to fight in a civil conflict.  Namely, 76% (thirteen out of 
seventeen) of the people with the monthly income less then the 300 Euros equivalent 
while 81% (nine out of eleven) with the income over 300 Euros equivalent both agree 
with the proposed hypothesis; 79% (eleven out of fourteen) people in the sample whose 
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properties owned are worth less than 5,000 Euros equivalent and 81% (nine out of 
eleven) of the sample whose properties owned are valued more than 5,000 Euros 
equivalent agree with the proposed hypothesis.  When it comes to the expressed levels 
of political tolerance, 70% (twelve out of seventeen) of the sample whose income levels 
are less than 300 Euros equivalent and 63% (seven out of eleven)of those whose 
monthly income levels are above 300 Euros equivalent express intolerant political 
attitudes; 71% (ten out of fourteen) of the sample who declared their properties owned 
valued less than 5,000 Euros equivalent while 81% (nine out of eleven) of the persons in 
the representative sample who value their properties over 5,000 Euros equivalent hold 
politically intolerant views. 
 
6.2 Key Patterns 
 
Looking over our representative sample as a whole, we observe a strong trend of 
the agreeing with our proposed hypothesis, that people with more practical experience 
and less formal education are more likely to fight in a civil conflict; with 83% (twenty-five 
out of thirty) in agreement with the hypothesis and only 10% (three out of thirty) in 
disagreement where the remaining 7% (two out of thirty) has failed to provide valid 
answers. 
When in comes to the expressed levels of political tolerance towards the other 
ethnic group and acceptance of their political goals we find that "only" one third, 33% 
(ten out of thirty) holds politically tolerant attitudes towards the other side, while the 
remaining 66% (20 out of thirty) remains politically intolerant. 
This being said, some of the tested variables, prominently differ from the 
generalizations of the representative sample.  For example, when studying results of the 
surveyed AGE variable, we find that the examinees of the youngest age group (18-27) do 
tend to express politically more intolerant attitudes than the older correspondents with 
all of the examinees (100%) expressing highly intolerant attitudes towards the "political" 
other.  As mentioned in the sections above, this observation may be attributed both to 
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the past personal experiences which often affects youngest population the most, as well 
as the fact that the local society does not impart the certain values that would promote 
political tolerance (exp. universalistic principles, cosmopolitan identities and 
commitments) and more tolerant young urban residents.  Only one sub-group, of all the 
variables tested here, holds more tolerant political outlook toward the other side; this is 
the second (28-37) age group where 63% (five out of eight) manage to find arguments 
for the understanding of the "others" political goals. 
Results have not shown the direct connection between gender and political 
tolerance levels.  Results obtained are consistent in stating that only thirty three percent 
of females (three out of nine, 33.3%) and twenty eight percent of males (six out twenty 
one, 28.6%) expressed politically tolerant attitudes. 
Surveying the levels of political tolerance amongst the single and married 
participants of the study; we find that single persons hold higher intolerant political 
attitudes towards the other group with 92% (eleven out of twelve), while the married 
participants of the study appear more politically tolerant with 41% of the sample (seven 
out of seventeen) with tolerant attitudes compared with 47% the sample (eight out of 
seventeen) that expressed intolerant political views; while the rest 12% failed to provide 
valid answers.  Corresponding to the Golebiowska's theory of political tolerance, where 
she states that certain values held tend to communicate political tolerance; this could 
be relevant in interpreting the surveyed results as we could anticipate that the set of 
values and priorities held by the married portion of the sample and persons with 
children could highly differ from the sets of values and priorities held by the other part 
(singles) of the representative sample and could therefore provide theoretical 
explanation to this trend. 
We also observe the trend where the people with no supported persons in their 
households do tend to agree with the proposed hypothesis in much higher percentage 
(eighteen out of twenty, 90%) than the people surveyed that do have one or more 
supported members in their households (five out of ten, 50%). 
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When it comes to the expressed levels of political tolerance towards the 
legitimacy of the "other" side's political goals, our results fail to show a strong link 
between the levels of formal education and properties owned and political tolerance; 
accordingly 31% of the representative sample within the ranks of lower educated and 
less properties owned express tolerant political attitudes which is exactly the same 
(31%) as the percentage of higher educated and people with more properties owned 



























Within the context of the Kosovo and Metohija conflict, this work has dealt with 
the effects of socio-economic structure as it relates to political tolerance and combat 
propensity; it has made a sound effort to illustrate exactly to what extent socio-
economic variables have had an influence on the political tolerance and the politically 
violent behavior of active participants in political violence.  After the year long data 
collection in Kosovo and the conscious theoretical research design this work presented a 
systematic and quantitative representation of the economic and social demographic 
(variables) included in the representative sample and the qualitative exploration of the 
motives and incentives of those who participated in political violence in the region as 
well as the issues relating to political tolerance and combat propensity. 
 
 7.1 Theoretical overview 
 
 As mentioned earlier in the text, vast amount of theoretical literature 
encompassed in this text highlights the authority of education on bettering recognition 
of political variety and diversity in general.  Higher education is commonly associated 
and correlates with higher levels of political tolerance and it leads to creation of 
individual principles and priorities that are communicating greater sincerity and 
allegiance to political diversity. 
Economic prosperity in advanced industrial societies also initiates a gradual shift 
in individual’s value priorities and hence demonstrates the influence of education on 
tolerance due to its direct stimulus and shaping of the individual’s value system.  As 
Inglehart suggests, people raised within various economic conditions exhibit various 
“value priorities” and he continues to say that higher levels of economic prosperity help 
create an increased sense of personal security that we can observe as it manifests 
through a decline of vulnerability to the external environment and consequently leads 
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to greater tolerance towards diversity and decline in traditional customs and levels of 
religiosity. 
Modernization theory through its complex division of labor, high communication 
levels, urbanization and rationalization of political resources tends to show the way and 
introduce more universalistic principles and commitment to more cosmopolitan 
identities, especially among young urban residents and people with greater 
occupational status and educational attainment.  This is somewhat challenged by Sekulic 
and Massey as they state in their research of former Yugoslavia that the education has 
only a modest effect on intolerance and stress the importance of the levels of urbanism 
and socio political participation as the stronger variables that influence the decline in 
the intensity levels of political tolerance.  According to Needler, some levels of political 
development (political tolerance levels) directly correlates to the levels of economic 
development (national GNP per capita).   
Modernization theory states that industrialization through its associated socio-
political participation and occupational transformations imparts greater universalism 
and acceptance of ethnic and national differences and is more important in generating 
increased tolerance than the effects of industrialization on education and the 
occupational structure.  So it is exactly thorough these processes that Stevenson and 
Morrison conclude that increased modernization decreases the probability of political 
instability. 
Social theories generally are of the consistent opinion that one’s values and 
beliefs go in line with their actions and behavior, and that socio-economic rank is very 
much associated with almost every kind of behavior.  Kriesberg says that correlation 
between socio-economic rank and (political) behavior can be either cultural or 
situational.  Cultural relates to a class subculture with an integrated system of values, 
beliefs and behavior patterns and the situational recounts that there are no differences 
in values and beliefs and that the differences in behavior are the direct result of various 
socio-political or economic opportunities.   
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According to Staub, when intense political violence occurs, individuals and 
groups are prone to change as a direct result of that hostility and usually in the direction 
that makes future political violence perpetual.  This notion closely correlates to the fact 
that during these socio-political processes common values and principles are replaced 
with higher priority values that are usually derived from popular non tolerant ideologies 
with the vision of devaluated others, which could than lead to cultural and 
institutionalized discriminations and become highly resistant to change. 
 The capacity to contain the aforementioned theories in a way that it 
communicates a relationship and accommodates it to the research question of this 
study could be that; the higher the levels of mutual and self understanding and ranks of 
socio-political processes between the two or more competing groups, and the more 
equally distributed balance of power among the groups over the competing resources, 
the higher is the possibility of acceptable socio-political behavior that consequently has 
a positive influence on tolerance levels and societal capacity that through judicial and 
legal resolving of conflicts reduces the potential for combat propensity and political 
intolerance of its individuals and groups. Equality in the balance of power and mutual 
recognition of needs, supported by the economic development, is always at the very 
foundation of the values in the peaceful and free socio-political society. 
 
 7.2 Interviews and the representative sample 
 
The interviews underline the notion that the majority of the combat active 
participants of the conflict came from the rural and underdeveloped areas which closely 
correlates to the groups of low levels of income and formal education.  This way, 
interviews only cautiously confirm the proposed hypothesis concerning the levels of 
formal education and active combat engagement, stating that people with low levels of 
formal education are more inclined to political intolerance.  The drawback of such a 
claim could be that while our interviewees actually refer to the levels of formal 
education they might also be refereeing it in a more general context where they see 
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education as it influences other important variables such as for example levels of 
urbanism and socio-political participation; As they continue to stress the importance of 
the fact that potential combat propensity and political intolerance is highly dependent 
on exactly the levels of urbanism, meaning of where the people live, actually whether 
they are living in ethnically mixed communities and whether they come into contact 
with people of different ethnic origin, as it was mostly, not exclusively, related to the 
urban areas. 
Due to the small size of the representative sample, we fail to see any coherent 
correlation between the different age group, gender, levels of formal education and 
their influence on the levels of political tolerance, but offer only a speculative notion 
based on the theoretical concept that these variables do impact the levels of political 
tolerance directly and indirectly by imparting and influencing certain values; We fail to 
clearly point to direct correlation between the tested variables cross-referenced to the 
levels of political tolerance.  Instead, through interviews and the theoretical overview 
we come to the notion that most of the tested variables, in the sense of their 
correlation to the expressed levels of political tolerance, could be attributed to the 
different situational factors such as past personal experiences, social background, place 
of residence, urban vs. rural, etc.  Marital status, the number of children and the 
number of supported persons in the households do show a somewhat dampening effect 
on political intolerance again due to the fact that sets of values and priorities held by the 
married portion of the sample can be associated with more 'safer' values and can 
acutely differ from the sets of value priorities held by the other segment of the 
representative sample.  With modest or no effect directly related to any of the 
particularly tested variables, large section of the representative sample (83%), agrees 
with the proposed hypothesis that people with more practical experience and less 
formal education are more likely to actively participate in political violence and fight in 
the civil conflict and only one third (33%) of the sample expressed higher levels of 
political tolerance towards the other group. 
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Our interviews also go very much in line with the notions of Staub and his theory 
which states that when intense violence occurs values of both groups and individuals 
are liable to alteration in a way that perpetuates and enables future violence to be 
“greater, easier and more likely.”  Usual values and principles are replaced with higher 
priority values derived from ideologies, as stated in the interviews with the KFOR 
officers, they confirm “that in the war the human values turn upside down…” and that 
human values mostly recognized during the conflict are “callousness, hardness and 
toughness..”, and they make a direct connection of these values as they compare them 
to the respect for formal education during the time of peace in civilized societies.  
Therefore, although they somewhat confirm a weak correlation between levels of 
formal education and political tolerance they also in some aspects challenge education 
as s sole instrument of tolerance and introduce a notion that socio-political and 
economical opportunities play well into the Kriesberg’s theory that correlation between 
socio-economic rank and political (violence) behavior is very much situational in a sense 
that political behavior is a direct consequence of socio-political and economic prospects.  
As our interviewees confirm, faced with extreme (sometimes even criminal) pressures 
and notions of “either with, or against us” majority of the time leaves no choice to 
groups and individuals and reinforces the situational theory that in the light of 
aforementioned plays down and minimizes the tested variables.  This notion is also 
substantiated in the interviews of the NGO officers working in Kosovo and Metohija as 
they emphasize the importance of the fact that the majority of the combat-active 
participants of the conflict came from the rural and underdeveloped areas of the society 
and believe that considerable mass of them comes from the groups categorized by low 
levels of income and formal education.  In general, interviewees rank levels of formal 
education on the fourth place of the scale of tested variables that influence levels of 
political tolerance, behind past experiences, personal background and place of 





 7.3 Historical origins of political violence in the regional context 
 
Historically, at the origins of these past conflicts is the decline of a ruling political 
power of the state that leads to tenacious shift in the balance of power and the vacuum 
of socio-political legitimacy and hence to the increased tensions and a decrease in the 
levels of political tolerance.  Namely here, the decline in the influence of the communist 
party of Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the weakening of the central power of 
the state can be traced to, in the political context, the decline of the influence of the 
Ottoman Empire in the region as it is related to the origins and the perpetuation of the 
conflict and hence to levels of decreased political tolerance in the region.  If we 
concentrate on the geographic region of Kosovo and Metohija, and one could also 
maybe extend this notion to all regions of the former Yugoslavia where political violence 
took place (but with different colonial powers ruling the region), we could observe a 
trend of continuous shifts in political power over the region and a constant tension 
between the socio-political elites in the area which was at base and 'laid the ground' for 
future political violence and the decreased levels of political tolerance; starting with the 
1876 and the liberation wars against the Turks and continuing throughout Balkan wars 
(1912, 1913), First and Second World Wars (1914-1918; 1939-1945) and changes in the 
constitution of former Yugoslavia which is a direct result of the strife and the elite 




Theoretical concepts related to this study embed the socio-economic variables 
and their influences on political tolerance and combat propensity and do provide some 
direct but very tangible connections between the two.  We do not find major patterns 
and generalization among the results that could indisputably confirm our proposed 
hypothesis that persons with higher levels of formal education are less prone to acts of 
political violence, but we can observe a trend where certain sets of values represented 
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by some of the tested variables do in fact lead to a more tolerant political attitude.  A 
likely cause that underlines this line of reasoning is clearly inferred from the direct 
connection of the theoretical models presented in this text and the qualitative 
interviews which concur on the issue and their correlation to the tested variables of the 
representative sample.  In particular, this research has produced a conclusion where 
levels of formal education alone or any of the other tested variables do not by 
themselves directly lead to the greater political tolerance, but indirectly thorough 
independently imparting certain sets of values and individual value properties can show 
the way to the increased levels of political acceptance and social open-mindedness.  
One of the issues, I feel, this work helps better understand, is the notion that there is a 
weak correlation between the individual values properties and a certain one socio-
economic variable (tested here); much stronger is the association between the 
development of the sets of ‘democratic’ values which is based not only on the tested 
levels of socio-economic variables but also on the situational and psychological 
perspectives of collectives and individuals.  It is exactly these ‘sets of values’ which could 
be affected, although not exclusively by, socio-economic variables that can impart 
increases in the levels of political tolerance.  Practical justification of this work’s 
development is that it bluntly illustrates the fact that for the groups and individuals, 
with no (direct) correlation on the levels of formal education attained or association 
within the certain socio-economic echelons, it is harder to reach ‘democratic’ and 
politically acceptive and tolerant value properties if their society as a whole does not 
share, emphasize nor practice those same values and principles.  If further developed, 
this work could aspire to substantiate a future sustainable development of socio-
economically based conflict resolution programs in the region that could be used as 
remedial actions to tackle the issues of political intolerance in the area.  As society at a 
critical juncture, in Kosovo, one could recommend the establishment of gender 
empowerment and emancipation programs, urbanism and social participation, decline 
in religiosity, peace education and youth cooperation programs to be superseded and 
encompassed by economic development and political support.  Either peace, 
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reconstruction and a cooperative framework for the region are to be established, or 
disastrous consequences will be wrought upon the Balkans and Europe as a whole.  
Societal stakeholders must make the necessary effort to underpin the culture of peace 
and tolerance in the region.  Failure to sustain development investment, human rights 
monitoring and support for civil society in the area will almost certainly lead to a 
renewal of ethnic conflict, as well as a large-scale and potentially uncontrollable 
movements of population out of the region.  There is only one condition of freedom in 


































8. APPENDIX – TABLES 
 
Legend: H+ / Agreement with proposed hypothesis 
  H- / Disagreement with proposed hypothesis 
  T+ / Tolerant political attitudes 
  T- / Intolerant political attitudes 
 
Table 1.1 - AGE 
 
Age Groups Number H+ H- T+ T- 
18-27 7 7 - - 7 
28-37 8 7 1 5 3 
38-47 6 4 2 2 4 
48-57 4 3 - 1 3 
58+ 5 4 - 2 3 
 
Table 1.2 – GENDER 
 
Gender Number H+ H- T+ T- 
F 9 8 1 3 6 
M 21 16 5 6 15 
 
Table 1.3 – MARITAL STATUS AND No. OF CHILDREN 
 
 Number H+ H- T+ T- 
Single 12 12 - 1 11 
Married 17 11 4 8 7 
 




Number H+ H- T+ T- 
0 20 18 2 7 13 
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1-3 8 4 2 3 5 
4 2 1 1 - 2 
 




Number H+ H- T+ T- 
Elementary 
School 
12 8 2 4 7 
High School 8 8 1 3 6 
University 8 1 1 2 7 
 




Number H+ H- T+ T- 
-100e 4 4 - 1 3 
100e-300e 13 9 3 4 9 
300e-1,000e 9 7 2 2 6 
+1,000e 2 2 - 1 1 
 
Table 1.7 – PROPERTIES OWNED 
 
Net Worth Number H+ H- T+ T- 
-1000e 4 4 - - 4 
1,000e-
5,000e 
10 7 2 4 6 
5,000e-
20,000e 
8 7 - 1 7 
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